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ABSTRACT 
The Nkandlagate scandal, in which the South African President, Jacob Zuma allegedly spent an 
estimated R246 million of taxpayers’ money on the renovation of his Nkandla residence, created 
huge public outcry. This reached yet another height in 2015 when Zuma’s administration 
declared that the President was not going to pay back the money as demanded by the South 
African publics. The publics of South Africa used social media platforms to express themselves 
over the decision. Studies have shown that social media platforms provide an opportunity for 
political mobilisation of publics and their participation in democracy. Using critical discourse 
analysis, this study seeks to investigate how South African publics engaged in the social media 
platform, particularly Facebook, over Nkandlagate. The research focuses on the discussions by 
two political parties’ Facebook pages: an opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters 
(EFF), and the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The analysis involves posts and 
comments made by South African publics on each of the Facebook pages to establish how South 
Africans made use of Facebook to express themselves over Nkandlagate, how the two parties 
covered Nkandlagate and what kind of discourse emerged from the parties’ posts. The concepts 
used in this research include the networked public sphere, democracy, watchdog and collective 
will/opinion. Three dimensions of critical discourse analysis were used for data analysis in this 
study: description (text genres), interpretation (discursive type) and explanation (social 
practice.) The insights of South African publics social practices were recognised. This research 
argues that to a large extent, social media has provided South African publics with access to 
Facebook a public sphere through which democracy – particularly in terms of freedom of speech 
– is exercised.  However, there is a lack of democratic interaction in that although there was 
interactive engagement amongst publics, there was a lack of interactive engagement between 
politicians and publics. 
Keywords:  Social media, public sphere, Facebook, democracy, Nkandlagate 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
 
This study is a critical discourse analysis of how South African publics engaged in the social 
media platform, namely Facebook, over Nkandlagate. This is the term coined and used to 
describe the scandal over the use of public funds to upgrade President Jacob Zuma‟s Nkandla 
residence
1
. The research focuses on the issues surrounding Nkandlagate over a one-year period 
in 2015. When Nkandlagate became news, it gained its prominence for the very first time in 
2009. Although there were ongoing formal and informal debates and discussions over the issue 
from 2009 to 2015 – between and amongst political parties, media and publics (including 
scholars) – the unstoppable furore was concentrated in 2015.  
During 2015, Nkandlagate received an infamous boost from the involvement of the Public 
Protector. It was also in 2015 that the Public Protector, headed by the fearless Advocate Thuli 
Madonsela, became a driver and hope for the entire public to bring the matter to finality. As a 
researcher, I picked the 2015 period as ideal, central and interesting and selected this research. It 
was also in 2015 that Nkandlagate protests, demonstrations and various social and community 
gatherings gained momentum and voices to show discontent, dismay and anger. The scandal 
gained additional prominence as the protests against Nkandlagate rose to new heights.  
International media houses, such as CNN, BBC and various international print media, joined the 
reporting as the focus turned on South African Constitution, the Public Protector, democracy and 
President Zuma. Pay back the money became a hashtag whereby various concerned South 
African publics
2
 protested against the Nkandla spending in more organised ways, even on social 
media. Every protest or demonstration in the streets was then translated into social media. 
Organised nationwide marches grew bigger, wider and far reaching after the ANC declared in 
                                                          
1
 England, A. (2014). Jacob Zuma defiant on ‘Nkandlagate’ ahead of South Africa elections *Online+. Available: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b8019b8a-d457-11e3-a122-00144feabdc0.html#axzz42FTjFKfB [05/08/2015]. 
2
 These were artists; actors and singers, organisations like Right2Know, United Front, EFF, and some of the South 
African unions, representatives of the Archbishop of the Anglican churches of Cape Town and the Public Protector, 
Thuli Madonsela. 
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parliament on 6 August that President Zuma would not pay back the said money
3
. Political 
activists, especially those from the EFF, called for South African publics to engage in 
discussions across various social media platforms concerning Nkandlagate
4
. This research 
examines how publics expressed themselves over Nkandlagate, by critically analysing the 
discourses that emerged on both the EFF and ANC Facebook pages during 2015.  
1.2. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 
Technologies enable and constrain human practices; their main dimensions are the material 
access to them (mainly with the help of money in modern society, as technologies are sold as 
commodities) and the capability to use them for self-benefit and the benefit of others (Fuchs & 
Horak, 2008). Therefore, another major challenge to social media and the Internet as a whole is 
the digital divide.  
The digital divide refers to unequal patterns of material access to, usage capabilities of, benefits 
from computer-based information and communication technologies that are caused by certain 
stratification processes that produce classes of winners and losers of the information society, and 
participation in institutions governing ICTs and society (Fuchs & Horak, 2008: 101).  
 
Material access refers to a lack of possession of computers and network connections, such as 
hardware, software, applications, networks and the usability of ICT devices and applications. 
Usage and skills access refers to the capabilities needed for a person to operate ICT hardware 
and applications in order to produce meaningful online content and to be able to engage in online 
communication and co-operation. Benefit access refers to ICT usage for individual benefit and 
that which might advance a good society for all (Fuchs & Horak, 2008; Van Dijk & Hacker 
2003). Institutional access means publics‟ participation in institutions that govern the Internet 
and ICTs and to the empowerment of publics by ICTs to participate in political information, 
communication and decision processes. On the one hand, stratification patterns are social 
hierarchies, such as age, family status, ability, gender, ethnicity, origin, language and geography 
(urban/rural) (Fuchs & Horak, 2008: 101); the consequence of these categories is that different 
types of the social divide are created. On the other hand, unequal patterns of material access, 
                                                          
3
 Ndeze, B. (2014). ANC: Zuma won’t pay the money. IOL news. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-zuma-won-t-pay-the-money-1.1758213#.VlCXBc8VjIU [11/11/2015]. 
4
 This was said on 7 August 2015 when publics gathered outside the South African Constitutional Court in protest 
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usage capabilities, benefits and participation concerning ICTs are also due to class divisions. 
Hence, there is also an economic divide, a political divide and a cultural divide (ibid).  
Wilson (2006) outlines eight aspects of the digital divide which he relates to six demographic 
dimensions of the digital divide: gender, geography, income, education, occupation and 
ethnicity. These digital divide aspects are: physical access (access to ICT devices), financial 
access (cost of ICT services relative to annual income), cognitive access (ICT skills), design 
access (usability), content access (availability of relevant applications and information online), 
production access (capacity to produce one‟s own content), institutional access (availability of 
institutions that enable access) and political access (access to the governing institutions where 
the rules of the game are written) (Wilson, 2006: 300). 
Modern society is structured in such a way that there is a form of social capital that is 
accumulated and unevenly distributed in order to create different social classes and class 
fractions with different (high, medium, low) amounts of economic, political and cultural capital 
(Fuchs,  2003b). Structural inequalities are created by the multidimensional class structure of 
modern society resulting in gaps in access, usage/skills, benefit and participation concerning 
ICTs. People who are endowed with only a little economic, political or cultural capital are less 
likely to have access to ICT than those with high income, far-reaching and influential social 
relationships, good education and high skills. These people are more likely to have access to 
ICTs, to be capable of using ICTs, to benefit from this usage and to be supported in political 
participation by ICTs (Fuchs & Horak, 2008: 102). 
Despite there being rapid development and availability of ICTs in Africa – which have brought 
about a new era of new media, bringing with it immense possibilities for democracy in the form 
of freedom of expression – there  needs to be a careful approach to new media technologies as 
facilitators of democracy (Dzidonu, 2000). Although in Africa ICTs have been seen as enablers 
for the creation of democracy, the continent still lags behind in the development of ICT skills 
and infrastructure and the increase in ICT uptake and intensity of use. Key to the ICT debate is 
the problem of access which needs to be emphasised. Additionally, although the growing 
adoption of mobile phones recently has led to increased access to ICTs for many Africans and is 
regarded as key technology for democracy in Africa, air time and wireless Internet service 
remain costly and smartphones are still uncommon (Banda 2010; Goldstein & Rotich, 2008; 
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Oteku et al., 2010). This limited access to ICTs to the majority of Africans results in the 
limitation of device usage to occasional usage of voice and SMS, including use regarding media 
participation (Dugmore, 2009). Therefore, in Africa, more than anywhere else, Internet users are 
expected to be mostly well-educated, well-to-do people who reside in urban areas (Walton, 
2011). 
1.2.1. South Africa and the digital divide 
According to the November 2015 Internet World Stats, South Africa is the fifth largest country 
in Africa by population, with 54,777,809 people. Of these, only 26,841,126 are Internet users 
and 13,000,000 are Facebook users. Just like many other countries, South Africa is affected by 
the digital divide, with the most challenges being: a high level of inequality; a weak ICT 
infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, and a lack of ICT readiness in government, with more 
pressing demands in the public service that make ICT development a lower priority in budget 
terms (Muneri, 2015). From these statistics, there is undisputable evidence that most South 
Africans do not have access to the Internet, let alone Facebook. A number of media and 
journalism scholars, like Moyo (2009), Chuma (2014), Mabweazara (2014), and Muneri (2015), 
have addressed the issue of access from various theoretical perspectives. Moyo 2009 argues that: 
The disparities in the access to technologies can potentially affect access to information from the 
Internet by the disadvantaged communities and also create or reinforce the social economic 
inequalities based on the digital marginalization of the poorer classes and regions (Moyo, 2009: 
122). 
 
Pointing out issues of access is not a failure to acknowledge the potential of technology to 
enhance democracy and therefore slightly bridge the long existing digital divide in South Africa. 
However, while acknowledging this potential of technology as being visible in South Africa, it is 
worth recognising it as being characterised by economic challenges which still create a digital 
divide in society; hence, failure for some people to use the Internet plethora of resources and 
facilities such as news and information in social media platforms, including Facebook. 
Although in South Africa and other African countries participation on the Internet is curtailed by 
factors like access, costs, censorship and lack of technological literacy, it can be argued that 
generally the Internet is a relatively open and accessible public sphere where anyone who has 
access can freely express their views as long as they can remain within the laws and do not 
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infringe on other people‟s rights (Moyo, 2009: 141). The Internet is capable of broadening 
citizens‟ participation, as it provides communicative space that can largely be connected to 
Habermas‟ concept of the public sphere and theorisation on civil society (Muneri, 2015).  
In terms of this research, the digital divide explores and clarifies the role of social media to 
compliment already powerful South African traditional media. The widespread usage of social 
media platforms, such as Twitter, Instagram, MySpace, YouTube, Flickr, Wikipedia and 
Facebook, become real time platforms to share news, create news, commentary and influence 
society in real time.  
This research cannot ignore the interrelatedness, intertwining and interlinking of various social 
media platforms and how to a certain extent they bridge the digital divide. A typical example is 
how a news bite of Nkandlagate would appear in a high-end newspaper like the Sunday Times, 
but a reader would extract an abstract to their Facebook profile, thread or post and then link the 
same headline to their Twitter page. This means that the same post will gain viewership, 
readership and awareness across various social media platforms, bridging the digital divide in 
real time. 
This research will also clarify that what happens on EFF and ANC Facebook pages has a ripple 
social media effect. Most users of Facebook accounts are linked to WhatsApp, Twitter and 
Instagram accounts. My research interest is Facebook, but the researcher is cognisant of the fact 
that a person in the rural areas of South Africa could receive the same news as the suburban rich 
and affluent Sandton dweller almost at the same time. That is the power and in discriminatory 
nature of social media. The Nkandlagate story became the most popular hashtag because of 
social media‟s ability to bridge social divide and avail the digital divide. 
 
1.3. RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
More and more people are increasingly using social media in Africa. According to the 2011-
2014 World Wide Worx Facebook reports by Arthur Goldstuck
5
, at the end of August 2011, 5.33 
million South Africans were using Facebook on the Web; and by August 2014, there were 11.8 
                                                          
5
 Arthur Goldstuck is the Managing Director of World Wide Worx technology market researchers. 
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million Facebook users in South Africa. This is a reflection of Facebook going mainstream in 
South Africa. It is generally accepted that social media networks affect politics (Toivo, 2014). 
Likewise, worldwide, political parties are shifting towards more participatory models of policy 
development using social media, thereby deepening democracy (ibid).  However, such potential 
of social media in Africa has not been extensively explored, as has been the case in western 
countries. Some scholars – for example, Daniels (2015), Muneri (2015) Rodrigues and Schiffrin 
et al. (2015) – have argued that social media platforms such as Twitter present an opportunity for 
the deepening of democracy. One of the key findings of a research done by Daniels (2015) on the 
use of social media – mainly Twitter – in the Johannesburg newsroom, for example, was that 
journalists‟ public engagement on Twitter appears to be neither widespread nor that deep 
(Daniels et al., 2015: 308). Journalist spaces are indeed opening up but they are not as expansive, 
inclusive and wide open, as most users continue to be the elite (ibid: 309). Daniels therefore 
argues that democracy in Africa in this respect is yet to come (ibid). However, this research does 
not focus on journalists‟ use of Twitter, but of the publics‟ use of Facebook to voice protest and 
interact with opinion leaders, colleagues, friends and acquaintances that can either consolidate or 
weaken the voters‟ opinions. On the other hand, Muneri (2015) argues that although social media 
has offered an opportunity for greater participation, not all publics have a chance for such 
participation, due to political and economic constraints (Muneri, 2015: 179). 
Other scholars, such as Rodrigues and Schiffrin (2015), have looked at some of the efforts by 
African publics to try and examine economics, corruption and the extractive sector using digital 
technology. Their argument is that although publics are making efforts to expose the many 
corrupt and environmental, social and economic effects of the large extractive companies (oil, 
gas and mining) – using social media for example –their efforts have not succeeded in bringing 
about the needed large, systematic structural changes. According to them, one of the reasons for 
this failure is the lack of transparency, as these efforts are not accompanied by accountability 
from the government and companies (Rodrigues & Schiffrin, 2015: 125).  
However, it is valuable to understand what those publics who participate in the discussions on 
social media regarding politics are saying, how and why are they saying it and what the impact 
may be.  Examination of the meanings behind their discussions is important as it could be a way 
of assessing the level of democracy brought about by social media to publics. This research 
7 
 
examines the discourses that emerged from the Nkandlagate posts on Facebook in order to 
ascertain the extent to which this has enriched or not enriched the democratic space in South 
Africa. The South African publics entered the space of public debate and discourse which was 
previously only occupied by journalists, academics, analysts and commentators. The Facebook 
space was unmediated and allowed for a free flow of thought and debate. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.4.1.  Central Research Question 
How did South African publics use Facebook to express themselves over Nkandlagate?  
1.4.2. Sub Questions 
What was the political parties‟ coverage of Nkandlagate?   
What kind of discourse from publics emerged on Facebook about Nkandlagate?  
Why did South Africans use Facebook to express themselves over Nkandlagate? 
 
1.5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
This research used Nkandlagate and the medium of Facebook as a case study. It is qualitative 
research using critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodological approach. The 
methodology was chosen because social media, which is also the main source of data in this 
research, is a discursive system and this will be discussed extensively in Chapter 3. The research 
used purposeful sampling methods.  
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1.6. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The rest of the research report will be presented as follows: 
Chapter 2: This chapter discusses a literature review and crucial topics in line with the research, 
including participatory democracy and social media. The literature review starts with an outline 
of preliminary studies to provide useful information to help understand some issues and concepts 
that are directly related to the topic under study. 
Chapter 3: This theoretical framework section will discuss the various social media theorists 
and the concepts that will be useful for this research report. It will make the link between 
democracy and social media. 
Chapter 4: This chapter discusses the research design and methodology used in the gathering of 
data for this study. The chapter discusses in detail the qualitative method, sampling and data 
collection strategy used in this research and describes Fairclough‟s critical discourse analysis as 
the main methodological approach to this study. 
Chapter 5: Data analysis of the study will be disseminated in this chapter. It is the section in 
which all the analyses on Facebook posts and comments will be made to find out relevant themes 
for this research.   
Chapter 6: The findings of this study will be discussed in this section. This chapter will draw 
together all the findings and use the social media theorist (Benkler) to make some useful 
reflective conclusions about publics‟ use of Facebook on Nkandlagate. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A literature review is an objective, thorough summary and critical analysis of the relevant 
available research and non-research literature on the topic being studied (Hart, 1998). Fink, 
(2009) defines a literature review as „the process of reading, analysing, evaluating and 
summarising scholarly materials about a specific topic‟ (ibid: 1). A good literature review 
gathers information about a particular subject from many sources, with the primary goal of 
providing the reader with current insights on the topic being studied (Carnwell & Daly, 2001). A 
literature review helps in forming the basis for other goals, such as the justification for future 
research in the area (Cronin et al., 2008:  38). „For scholars, the depth and breadth of the 
literature review emphasises the credibility of the writer in his or her field‟ (Black, 2007: 2).  
This research‟s main focus is on new media – particularly social media, and specifically 
Facebook – and its usage by publics when engaging in the discussions concerning controversial 
issues. In this case, the focus of the research is on the discussions on political parties‟ Facebook 
pages about Nkandlagate and the ongoing controversy in South Africa. The term „social media‟ 
cannot be mentioned without a discussion of the popular Facebook.  While to the general public 
Facebook conjures friends and family, scholars might think of democracy related issues. This 
research on Facebook is concerned with the freedom of expression aspect of democracy. To what 
extent did the discourses that emerged around Nkandlagate posts on Facebook enrich 
democracy?  
This research has examined literature concerning democracy in the form of participation by 
publics to express their views, basically known as „participatory democracy‟. Its meanings and 
practices, including participatory journalism, have also been discussed. New media has also been 
defined in the literature review as an enabling factor for participatory democracy; social media 
and Facebook are closely related. The literature review has also discussed how political parties 
worldwide have used Facebook to their benefit, where they have been successful and not 
successful and the challenges they face using Facebook. This fact, and how voters use Facebook 
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and the challenges they face with it due to the digital divide, for example, has also been 
discussed extensively. With the focus on South Africa, the literature has included discussions on 
the enabling and constraining factors faced by South Africans in their usage of new media 
technologies, the involvement of South African political parties on social media platforms and 
the challenges and positives they have experienced.  
In order to be able to better appreciate the rationale for this study, one needs to understand some 
issues and concepts that are directly related to the topic under study.  This researcher provides 
some preliminary studies for contextual purposes.  The chronological order for the literature 
review is as follows: preliminary study, participatory democracy, new media defined, 
participatory journalism, social media networks, challenges associated with social media, 
Facebook and the power influence of social media for politicians, as well as benefits and 
challenges. 
 
2.2. PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
2.2.1. Brief history of President Jacob Zuma 
 
Born on April 12, 1942, in Nkandla, northern Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal), South Africa, Jacob 
Gedleyihlekisa Zuma became the Chairperson of the ANC‟s Southern Natal region in November 
1990.  He was then elected the Deputy Secretary General for the party in 1991. In December 
1994, Zuma was elected National Chairperson of the ANC and Chairperson of the ANC in Natal. 
At the ANC‟s National Conference held at Mafikeng in December 1997, Zuma was elected as 
the ANC‟s Deputy President.  In 1999 he was appointed as the Deputy President of South Africa. 
He was then elected President of the ANC on 18 December 2007 with 2,329 votes, beating 
Mbeki's 1,505 votes, and was sworn in and became the President of South Africa on 9 May 2009 
(Legassick, 2014). This was after the breakdown in the relationship between the ruling ANC and 
its presidential appointee, Thabo Mbeki, in September 2008 when the ANC National Executive 
Committee deemed Mbeki unfit to govern South Africa. Mbeki elected not to challenge this 
decision and resigned as President of South Africa on 21 September 2008 (Mbeki, 2008). Zuma 
was re-elected as ANC leader at the ANC conference in Manguang on 18 December 2012, 
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defeating challenger and then Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, by a large majority
6
. 
Following the 2014 general elections on 21 May 2014, in which the ANC retained their majority, 
Zuma was elected for a second term as President by the National Assembly
7
.  
Zuma began engaging in politics at an early age and joined the ANC in 1959
8
. Zuma‟s father was 
a policeman who died when Zuma was young; his mother was a domestic worker. He did not 
receive formal education
9
.   
Zuma began his political career in the ANC at a young age by attending the party‟s meetings as a 
volunteer in Durban
10
. In 1959, he joined the ANC and the African National Congress Youth 
League (ANCYL). That same year, he joined the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) and began attending ANC and trade union meetings at Lakhani Chambers in central 
Durban from 1960 to 1963, while attending political education classes
11
. In 1960, after the ANC 
was banned, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was formed as its armed wing, of which Zuma became 
an active member. He and other MK members were arrested in June 1963 on their way to 
Botswana for military training. Zuma was released on 29 December 197312. In December 1975, 
Zuma left South Africa for Swaziland and then Mozambique. In Swaziland, Zuma was 
responsible for running the ANC‟s Swaziland/Natal operations. He was re-arrested In March 
1976, along with Thabo Mbeki and Albert Dlomo, and held at the Matsapha prison in Swaziland. 
Alongside his comrades, Zuma was released in April 1976 and deported to Mozambique. In 
Mozambique, Zuma dealt with the thousands of young people who left South Africa after the 
Soweto uprising in June 1976. However, Zuma‟s work remained largely focused on the internal 
underground of the ANC. While in Mozambique, he was co-opted as a member of the ANC 
National Executive Committee (NEC) in 1977. By 1984, Zuma had been elected the Deputy 
Chief Representative of the ANC and was also appointed as Chief Representative of the ANC the 
year the Nkomati Accord was signed between Mozambique and South Africa; he remained in 
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Mozambique
13
. In December 1986, the South African government requested Mozambican 
authorities to expel six senior members of the ANC, including Jacob Zuma. As a result of the 
pressure applied by the apartheid government on Mozambique in January 1987, Zuma was 
forced to leave Mozambique for Zambia. While in Zambia, Zuma was re-elected to the ANC‟s 
NEC at the Kabwe Conference in 1985 and also served on the ANC's Military and Political 
Committees after their formation in the mid-1980s, and also the Intelligence Department at the 
ANC Head Office in Lusaka
14
. Along with Mbeki, Zuma formed part of the ANC President, 
Oliver Tambo‟s negotiation team, which met with the South African government representatives 
in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Zuma clandestinely returned to South Africa in March after the 
ANC was unbanned in February 1990
15
.   
As a politician, Zuma has faced significant legal challenges. He was charged with rape in 2005, 
but was acquitted. In addition, he fought a long legal battle over allegations of racketeering and 
corruption, resulting from the conviction for corruption and fraud by his financial advisor, 
Schabir Shaik. On 6 April 2009, the National Prosecuting Authority decided to drop the charges, 
citing political interference. Zuma has 700 charges against him
16
 relating to, amongst others, 
sexual assault, misogyny, nepotism, fraud and corruption. The ANC seems fractured and split 
over Zuma‟s numerous gaffes and mistakes; for example, Zuma made some controversial 
remarks that highways in Gauteng province are „not some national road in Malawi‟, and that 
South Africans should not „think like Africans generally‟17. Recently, Zuma was also implicated 
in what has been termed as Nenegate for firing and hiring finance ministers over a nuclear deal.  
Zuma is said to have aimed for direct control of the Treasury and state finances by holding the 
line on reckless government spending on an unaffordable US$100 billion nuclear power station 
programme and a threatened re-arrangement of a $624 million leasing deal with Airbus 
Industries
18
. The nuclear deal was being pushed hard by the Guptas, a powerful business family, 
                                                          
13
 (ibid) 
14
 (ibid) 
15
 (ibid) 
16
 Andrew, M. (2012). ‘Zuma has 700 charges, I only have one’. IOL News [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/zuma-has-700-charges-i-only-have-one-1390396 [5/3/2016]. 
17
 Fabricius, P. & Sapa (2013). Malawi insulted by Zuma remark. IOL News. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/malawi-insulted-by-zuma-remark-1596397 [5/13/2016].  
18
 Battersby, J. (2015). BRILLIANT: John Battersby unpacks Nenegate, Jacob Zuma’s greatest blunder. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2015/12/24/brilliant-john-battersby-unpacks-nenegate-jacob-
zumas-greatest-blunder/ [20/06/2016]. 
13 
 
who are said to have had major interests in uranium mining and are also close to Zuma. 
Influenced by the Guptas, Zuma fired the Finance Minister, Nhlanhla Nene, when Nene insisted 
on full observance of lawful procurement procedures in the nuclear programme and on major if 
not indefinite delays. The result was hundreds of billions of rand being wiped off the value of 
banking and financial shares and the battered currency, and the rand going into freefall and 
losing around 5% of its value. In one year, it had lost a third of its value against the dollar and 
sterling, with the rand touching R16 to the US$ and R24 to the British pound
19
. Nene was 
replaced by Des van Rooyen, who was in turn, within a couple of days, replaced by Pravin 
Gordhan
20
. There was a massive backlash in all sectors and widespread calls for Zuma to go
21
. 
Nkandlagate, which is central to this research, is another controversial issue currently 
surrounding President Jacob Zuma and his administration. The ANC appears split over support 
for the President over Nkandla, although publically they all appear to support him. While 
President Jacob Zuma had the unwavering support of many MPs over unauthorised expenditure 
on the security upgrades to his Nkandla home, some MPs prior to the Constitution Court 
judgment were now saying that they were merely following instructions
22
. Following the court‟s 
judgment on 31 March 2016 that Zuma should pay back the money –to which he and ANC 
officials agreed – some ANC MPs expressed their anger towards Zuma.  The MPs, especially 
those who were on the Nkandla committee, felt they were being used and abused by Zuma and 
think he undermined their work and „threw them under the bus‟23.   
2.2.2. Nkandla ‘gate’ background 
The suffix „gate‟, used to describe political scandals, dates back to the 1970s in Washington D.C. 
in the United States of America, when the term Watergate was coined. The U.S. Congress 
discovered a break-in at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at President 
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Richard Nixon‟s administration offices on 17 June 1972. Nixon‟s administration was discovered 
to be involved in illegal activities, such as bugging the offices of political opponents and people 
of whom they were suspicious
24
.   Apart from the discovery of multiple abuses of power by the 
Nixon administration, the scandal also led to articles of impeachment and even the resignation of 
Nixon as President in August 1974
25
. The term Watergate has come to incorporate a range of 
secret and often illegal activities undertaken by members of the Nixon administration and 
became famously known as Watergate after its scene of occurrence at the Watergate office 
complex in Washington, D.C. The suffix „gate‟ has since become synonymous with political 
scandals in the United States and globally. Similarly, in South Africa, the scandal in which 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was exposed for receiving funding 
from the security branch of the apartheid government in 1991 was described as Inkathagate
26
.  
Nkandlagate, which is the focus of this research, derives its name from President Jacob Zuma‟s 
Nkandla residence (City Press, 2013). Nkandla is a town in the uThungulu district of KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa and is the seat of the Nkandla Local Municipality.  The residence is located 
40 kilometres to the south of the town of Nkandla, beyond the Nkandla Forest and on the road to 
Kranskop. The Nkandla region encompasses nearly 115,000 inhabitants, spread relatively 
sparsely over a large area. Nkandla is mainly a rural area and is in the top five of the poorest 
places in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The majority of the population is Zulu
27
. Nkandlagate is 
one of the biggest stories in South Africa, in which President Jacob Zuma‟s renovations of his 
Nkandla residence is claimed to have cost almost R246 million of taxpayers‟ money (ibid). The 
Nkandla project started in May 2009, but the story surrounding Nkandlagate dates back to 
November 2009.   
Mail & Guardian journalists, Chris Roper (former editor) and Mandy Rossouw (now deceased), 
accidentally stumbled on the Nkandla development when they set out for Nkandla with the aim 
of interviewing the residents about how they felt about having the President of the country as 
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their neighbour. This is when they discovered that the seemingly dilapidated Nkandla residence 
was in the process of acquiring a new look, as there were some signs of development taking 
place in the area. Twelve people were seen digging and there was some heavy earth-moving 
machinery. Rossouw and Roper moved to the site office, where they saw the architectural 
drawings taped to a wall – these displayed extensive development plans of what Nkandla was 
destined to be transformed into, both as a large complex and as a massive story
28
. According to 
Roper, one of the people involved in the Nkandla homestead revealed to them that the total cost 
of renovations was estimated at R65 million, with the likelihood that this would be exceeded.  
Before publishing the story, the Mail & Guardian journalists asked the Executive arm of 
government for comments on the ongoing development. The government‟s response was that it 
had no records on the Nkandla development and no interest in President Zuma‟s personal 
property advancements. The government later released a public statement which read: „The 
Zuma family planned before the elections to extend the Nkandla residence and this is being done 
at own cost. No government funding will be utilised for the construction work‟29. At the same 
time, the government also accused the Mail & Guardian of „setting out to embarrass the 
President‟ by publishing the Nkandla story. On 3 December 2009, President Zuma issued a 
statement acknowledging the Nkandla project and also ordering that his privacy needed to be 
respected, while disputing any suspicions of abuse of state resources by his family
30
. This was 
seen by Mail & Guardian journalists as an attempt by the government to cover up the story
31
.  
On 4 December 2009, Rossouw published the first story on Nkandlagate in the Mail & Guardian 
with the heading: President Jacob Zuma is expanding his remote family homestead at Nkandla in 
rural KwaZulu-Natal for a whopping price of R65 million
32
. Nkandlagate has since been the 
centre of discussion in South Africa. While in 2009, the government refuted having any records 
about the Nkandla homestead, a 2013 formal report recorded that the Department of Public 
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Works was involved in the upgrade of Nkandla six months before Rossouw and Roper consulted 
government officials for comments over the story. Additionally, it was made known that the 
South African Police Service had become involved a full month before the questions were asked 
(De Wet, 2013). However, the Department of Public Works also denied that there was any work 
or extension project taking place at President Jacob Zuma‟s homestead at Nkandla.   
By 2014, R246 million estimated to have been spent on renovating not only the Nkandla 
residence, but also the supposed upgrades (firepool, the new cattle kraal, chicken coop and 
culvert, amphitheater and visitors‟ centre)33. Seven years have passed since 2009 with no effort 
by President Zuma‟s administration to investigate the story, although at first there was a promise 
to investigate the story by the Public Works Minister, Thulas Nxesi, who also promised to 
employ a Special Investigating Unit to launch its own probe. In January 2013, a government 
report which was highly contested by South African publics was released by Nxesi in which he 
reported that Zuma was neither culpable nor involved in the Nkandlagate scandal and had not 
received personal benefit
34
.    
On 19 March 2014, the Public Protector of South Africa released the Secure in Comfort report: 
„A report on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the 
installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public Works at and 
in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the Kwazulu-Natal 
Province‟. The report findings were that „the implementation of the security measures failed to 
comply with the parameters set out in the laws in question for the proper exercise of such 
upgrades and hence constitutes improper conduct and maladministration‟ (Madonsela, 2014: 
427-442).   
In response to the Secure in Comfort report, on 6 August 2015, Police Minister, Nkosinathi 
Nhleko, declared in parliament that President Jacob Zuma would not have to pay back any 
money stipulated to have been spent on his Nkandla homestead
35
. This was based on his Nkandla 
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report findings which he presented to parliament in Cape Town on 25 May 2015. The report 
stipulated that President Jacob Zuma did not have to repay a cent for the multimillion rand 
upgrades at his private home, because all of the features, including a swimming pool, were built 
for the President's security
36
.  
The issue of Nkandlagate regained prominence this particular year, 2015, as it had in 2009 when 
the story had just found its way into the media for the first time. Countrywide, South African 
publics organised protests on 7 August 2015 against Nhleko‟s speech. Involved in the protests 
were artists (actors and singers), organisations like Right2Know, United Front, EFF, some of the 
South African unions, representatives of the Archbishop of the Anglican churches of Cape Town 
and the Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela. 
Apart from these offline demonstrations, activists called for publics‟ participation on various 
social media such as Twitter and Facebook to indicate their disapproval of the declaration. The 
purpose of this research was to extract data from Facebook pages on Nkandlagate discussions, 
with Facebook being selected as it is easier for data extraction than Twitter and it is also flexible 
in the number of words one could write when compared with Twitter, which is limited to 140 
characters (Daniels, 2014: 300). Additionally, recent research has shown that Facebook is the 
most popular social media platform used by South Africans. According to Fuseware and World 
Wide Worx (2015) research findings, there are 11.8 million Facebook users in South Africa.  
 
2.3. FACEBOOK 
The main social media platform in this research is Facebook. Facebook is an online social 
networking service which was launched on 4 February 2004 by Harvard University Students, 
Mark Zuckerberg, Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz Chris Hughes and Andrew McCollum (Di 
Capua, 2012). After registering to use the site, users can create user profiles, add friends, 
exchange messages, post status updates and photos, share videos and receive notifications when 
others update their profiles. Users may also join common-interest user groups organised by 
workplace, school or college or other characteristics and categorise their friends into lists such as 
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„People from Work‟ or „Close Friends‟. According to Facebook Reports First Quarter 2015 
results, as of August 2015, Facebook had over 1.18 billion monthly active users. Facebook has 
become more and more a subject of interest for researchers and there have been more than a 
hundred studies published about Facebook since its establishment (ibid: 37). Unlike any past 
technologies, Facebook is part of the new media grounded on an interactive community (Lister et 
al., 2003; McNair, 2006). 
    
2.4. NEW MEDIA 
Most technologies described as „new media‟ are digital, often having characteristics of being 
manipulated, networkable, dense, compressible and interactive (Lister et al., 2003). According to 
Lister et al. (2003), the word „new‟ in new media, implying „the most recent‟, also gives an 
ideological sense that „new‟ is better, glamorous and exciting (Lister et al., 2003: 11). Banda et 
al. (2009) hold that new media is able to enmesh with old media by providing multimedia 
platforms through which greater democratic participation, inclusion and expression is practised 
(Banda et al., 2009: 2). Banda (2003) and Fourie (2001) argue that new media appear to have 
claims and hopes attached to them; they have ideologies for the possibility of the Third World 
„catching up‟ with the West.  New media also implies an aura of change. According to Lister et 
al. (2004), it has brought about several changes, including being seen to have sped up the 
deconstructive element of post modernity (Lister et al., 2004: 10-11). Although this is contested, 
it is widely subscribed to as a deep and structural characteristic of changes in societies and 
economies since the 1960s, with correlative cultural changes (ibid). For example, the shift from 
elitist to participatory forms of democracy is perceived as being associated with the less 
hierarchised nature of new media.  In this regard, new media is seen to have subverted the old 
hierarchies of communication, thereby decentering the very act of communication (Banda et al., 
2009: 3; Lister et al., 2004: 10).   
As argued by Lister et al. (2003), attached to „new media‟ is its quality of inclusiveness. New 
media technology is seen to have extended the old media interactivity possibilities by having, for 
example, online editions of newspapers and political parties‟ online forums, which enable 
inclusion and engage media audience (Lister et al., 2003: 11). Diversity of bias and a balance of 
19 
 
critical opinions have also increased (ibid: 139). There is also the stimulation of critical scrutiny 
of the political elite due to greater media competition and 24-hour news cycles.  Gimmler (2001) 
and Dahlgren (2005) also have positive views about the Internet having strengthened the public 
sphere and deliberative democracy (the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their 
representatives) by promoting more equal access to information, interactivity and a greater 
practice of discourse among publics (Gimmler, 2001: 31). 
Internet facilitates democratic discourse and civic culture to a wider range of publics, although it 
has consequences in the break-up of a singular, integrated public sphere into multiple, 
heterogeneous communicative forums and practices (Dahlgren, 2005). On the other hand, 
although „new media‟ seem to have improved qualities compared to old media, there are still 
issues of great concern; these include access, inequality, power and the quality of information 
available on new media technologies as discussed in the introduction (Fourie, 2003).   
However, Lister et al. (2003) and McNair (2006) argue that the Internet as the new media has 
strengthened participatory democracy by increasing the availability of opportunities to a wider 
range of people by enabling them to produce and distribute media (McNair, 2006: 135-140). 
 
2.5. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY  
The term „democracy‟ is a combination of two Greek words, (dêmos) to mean „people‟ and 
(krátos) to mean „power‟ or „rule‟ (Held, 2006).  Since its origination in Greece, there has never 
been unanimity on the definition of democracy. While in the past democracy meant participation 
of all „eligible publics‟ to speak and vote in the assembly, women, slaves, foreigners non-
landowners and males under 20 years old were automatically excluded as they were not deemed 
„eligible publics‟37. To this day, there still remain several variants of democracy, but the two 
basic forms are direct democracy and representative democracy, both concerned with how 
eligible publics execute their rights. Direct democracy is a form of democracy in which all 
eligible publics demonstrate direct and active participation in the political decision making. It is 
a democracy in which people have direct power to govern, as opposed to being governed by 
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representative
38
. Representative democracy is that in which political power is exercised 
indirectly through elected representatives, while the whole body of eligible publics remains the 
sovereign power
39
. Central to this research is direct democracy, also known as participatory 
democracy (Maduz, 2010: 1). David White (2015)
40
 defines participation in social science as 
various strategies used by people to express themselves and ideally exert influence in relation to 
political, economic, management or other social decisions.  
Whereas all democracy is to some degree participatory, with some form of an original consent 
given (e.g. constitution) and periodic popular elections, according to its advocates, direct 
democracy involves the extensive and active engagement of publics in the self-governing process. 
Seen in this light, direct or participatory democracy can be described as democracy itself, properly 
understood (Maduz, 2010: 1). 
 
In the twenty-first century, participatory democracy emphasises the wide participation of 
constituents in political systems. It aims to create opportunities for everyone to contribute 
meaningfully in making decisions and also to broaden the range of people with access to such 
opportunities (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). In order to achieve self-determination by publics, 
there is a need for democratic rights not to be restricted to political decision-making (Pateman, 
1970). While participatory democracy has been hailed for its ability to give space to originally 
marginalised voices, Sandoval and Fuchs (2010: 141) warn against being too optimistic about 
these concepts. Their argument is that understanding the concept of participatory democracy in 
contemporary society characterised by social and economic inequality is not enough. Sandoval 
and Fuchs (2010) argue that participatory media should be conceived as a „critical media‟ in 
which, apart from the political realm, democracy should also incorporate economy based systems 
such as participatory ownership and decision making. In this regard, participatory democracy 
will be able to provide „critical content‟ to the advancement of social transformation and 
contribution of genuine democracy. Sandoval and Fuchs‟s views are shared by Manji (2008), 
who argues that in a society with so many divisions and in which technology has a tendency to 
amplify instead of ameliorate social differences, there is nothing progressive about technology. 
However, researchers have generally hailed the Internet enabling tools such as social media to 
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have not only made participatory democracy possible, but which have also led publics to engage 
in journalism in what is termed as participatory journalism (Bowman & Willis, 2003). 
  
2.6. PARTICIPATORY JOURNALISM 
Bowman and Willis (2003) define participatory journalism as the ability by publics to engage in 
an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analysing and disseminating news and 
information with the purpose of providing independent, reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and 
relevant information as democracy requires (ibid: 9).  Bill Kovach (2001) further expounds on 
participatory journalism:   
In an era when anyone can be a reporter or commentator on the Web, „you move to a two-way 
journalism.‟ The journalist becomes a „forum leader,‟ or a mediator rather than simply a teacher or 
lecturer. The audience becomes not consumers, but „pro-sumers‟, a hybrid of consumer and 
producer (Kovach & Tom, 2001: 9). 
 
Participatory journalism is said to have brought about what is termed „media democracy‟. The 
concept of media democracy entails the use of information technologies to both empower 
individual publics and promote democratic ideals through the spread of information and the 
democratisation of the media system itself by preventing ownership concentration or strong 
regulation (Exoo, 2010). A key idea of media democracy is that recently, media ownership 
concentration in the hands of few corporations (state and private) and conglomerates has limited 
the range of voices and opinions being expressed in the media and has led to an increase in the 
commercialisation of news and information (McChesney, 1997).  A diverse range of information 
providers is essential for a democratic society to enable viewers, readers and listeners to receive 
a broad spectrum of information from varying sources that is not tightly controlled, biased and 
filtered (Golding & Murdock, 2000).  
The ability of traditional media to conduct investigative reporting and act as a public watchdog 
has also been eroded, leading to an increase in prioritising infotainment and celebrity news over 
informative discourse (Zhao, 1998). Erika Rodrigues and Anya Schiffin (2015) talk about the 
inability of traditional media in Africa to investigate the activities and finances of the large 
extractive sector companies. African journalists have found it difficult to undertake evocative 
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long-form investigative reporting to expose the environmental, economic and societal effects 
brought about by these extractive companies (Rodrigues & Schiffin, 2015: 124).   
A significant characteristic of participatory journalism is dialogue, as there is no central news 
organisation controlling the exchange of information – as is the case with traditional media. The 
conversation mechanism improves on the traditional roles of journalism and generates a 
dynamic, egalitarian give-and-take ethic (Bowman & Wills, 2003: 9). The fluidity of this 
approach emphasises the publishing rather than filtering of information, as conversations happen 
publically, as opposed to traditional news organisations that are structured to filter information 
before publishing it through collaboration among the editors and reporters, without involving the 
public (ibid).   
The different structures and organisations that produce traditional and participatory journalism 
also differentiate them. While traditional media are created by hierarchical organisations, 
participatory journalism is created by networked communities that value conversation, 
collaboration and egalitarianism (ibid: 12). While participatory journalism has been heralded as 
enhancing media democracy by greater participation of publics through the use of Internet-based 
tools such as Twitter and Facebook, research done by Daniels (2014) indicates that the level of 
that democracy, particularly on Twitter, is limited in access and content as it lacks a more 
inclusive diversity of voices.  Like Facebook, Twitter is mostly used by the elite to affirm each 
other‟s views (Daniels, 2014: 309).  
Participatory media has brought both challenges and opportunities for traditional media. Kristin 
Skare Orgeret (2015) states that the role of traditional media is under pressure today due to new 
technology and new media‟s facilitation of new cultural practices enabling societal change and 
shaping new practices of democracy and understandings of freedom of expression (Orgeret, 
2015: 142). Apart from the challenge of being stripped of their role as news gatekeepers, 
traditional media, especially newspapers, have seen a „shift of press advertising to the Internet 
and fragmented audiences moving increasingly to non-linear consumption which is less 
susceptible to commercial impact and therefore less valuable to advertisers‟ (Barnett, 2009: 2).  
Newspapers are now competing for advertising revenues and audiences with participatory 
publics. Wilkinson, McClung and Sherring (2009) have indicated The Drudge Report, Flickr, 
and Rocketboom as independent websites that became Internet brands. According to them, these 
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sites arguably compete with traditional media, because they attract advertising and audiences for 
particular types of news and/or content (Wilkinson et al., 2009). Traditional media are also in 
collision with non-media fields. Law firms create documentaries and multimedia presentations, 
while government relations people provide expertly crafted news reports and information 
services – as do hospitals and medical firms – which are professionally written and produced to 
the expectation of a standard news report (ibid).   
Professional journalists have criticised publics‟ generated content as lacking journalistic ethical 
standards, impartiality, newsworthiness and trustworthiness (Bowman & Wills, 2003). Publics 
may rush to break news without verification of facts and often correct sources of stories are 
difficult to trace 
41
 as some people may use fake identities. However, professional journalists are 
now trying to cooperate with this digital disruption. Media companies are now trying to 
incorporate publics in their news making. For example, it is increasingly common for newspaper 
websites to feature photo galleries where local amateur photographers can post their work, which 
visitors can even purchase. Daniels (2015) examines how newsrooms struggle for survival and 
have even turned to native advertising – paid-for content – or sponsored content that merges 
editorial content with advertising, due to failure of online advertising to compensate adequately 
for the loss in print advertising. Native advertising has been practised by The New York Times 
and The Wall Street Journal and has also been adopted by Mail & Guardian, City Press, Sunday 
Times and other newspapers in South Africa.  
 
2.7. SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS  
Social media are new information technology networks which use interactive forms of 
communication and user-generated content where there is creation and maintaining of 
interpersonal relationships (Lynch & Hogan, 2012). Social media – such as MySpace, Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube, wikis and blogs – foster interactions between users online. Boyd and 
Ellison (2007) define social media networks as web-based services that allow individuals to 
„construct a public or semipublic profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users 
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with whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others within the system‟ (Boyd & Ellison, 2007: 211). It is an Internet-based 
application that is built on ideological and technological foundations that allow the creation and 
exchange of user generated content (Balarabe, 2014).  
The existence of social media became noticeable worldwide during times of crisis, with the very 
first incident being the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. For 
the very first time, people looked to the web for eyewitness reports, some of which were even 
used by mainstream media
42
. The second crisis was during the 2004 Asian tsunami, where the 
photographs and videos which some tourists had uploaded on their personal blogs were used on 
television and in print (Lule, 2004). However, the 2005 London bombings took social media to 
the highest level when people who were affected by the attacks sent their images and personal 
accounts to mass media, making traditional media realise the potential of social media platforms 
in situations where their journalists/reporters could not be present in time (Siegl & Foot, 2004). 
Social media enables users to communicate and share information instantly and independently 
from their geographical location (Di Capua, 2012). Additionally, people are able to express how 
they feel and think and can also form online communities based on affinities, interests, political 
and religious views and common causes (ibid: 36).  
Characteristics that make social media possible in new media technologies are their ability to 
promote openness, connectivity, community, conversation and participation (Kapoor & 
Kulshrestha, 2014: 902). The openness of social media is due to there being few barriers to 
accessing information or making comments; hence promoting user feedback and participation 
(ibid).  Meadows-Klue (2007: 246) argues that a Web is a near-frictionless media channel along 
which anything can flow.  For example, the younger generation shares their lives on social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter and various organisations distribute information and receive 
feedback via their corporate blogs. This openness is a result of social media‟s networking 
philosophy; the availability of easy-to-use mechanisms for creating and sharing content. Having 
the characteristic of connectivity (defined as interpersonal), community and general social ties 
(Teixeira, 1992: 36), social media provides mechanisms through which interpersonal ties can be 
                                                          
42
 Outing, S. (2011). Taking Tsunami Coverage into Their Own Hands. The Pointer Institute. A Global Leader in 
Journalism [Online]. Available: http://www.poynter.org/uncategorized/29330/taking-tsunami-coverage-into-their-
own-hands/ [18/11/2015]. 
25 
 
maintained. Through social media, people who tie offline could easily expand their relationships 
and experiences online (Ha & James, 1998). Social media promotes community conversation by 
allowing individuals and organisations to identify and communicate with the people with whom 
they share some commonality (Kapoor & Kulshrestha, 2014).  Social media promotes a two-way 
conversation which differentiates it from traditional media channels such as television, radio, 
newspapers and magazines, as these only deliver a linear communication mechanism (Rowley, 
2004). Rafaeli (1988) argues that „conversationality‟ is an important virtue of social media as it 
is the ideal of interactivity. Participation is behaviour/action-oriented interactivity, whereas 
conversation is rooted in the communicational aspect of interactivity (Kapoor & Kulshrestha, 
2014). 
Social media networks are said to have presented an alternative space for: political discourse 
between publics; communication and interaction between politicians and the public they 
represent; oversight by publics of the operations of the state and publication of protest and 
dissent (Salanova, 2012). Studies by, for example, Yochai Benkler (2006), have shown that the 
advent of digital technologies that make social media possible has transformed the way civil 
servants and institutions disseminate information and communicate opinions. Benkler argues that 
social media have speeded the transmission of information at a lower cost amongst individuals, 
communities and organisations in a globalised era.   
Many studies have hailed social media for enabling publics to directly and actively exercise their 
rights on political issues through their participation on social media platforms. A situation report 
by the Institute for Security (2012) argues that „social media have the potential to facilitate the 
active citizen political engagement required to bring about political change in Africa‟ (Chatora, 
2012: 1). Benkler (2006) argues that the Internet as a tool for mobilisation has presented to 
people the potential of being speakers, rather than just being listeners. Apart from challenging 
the traditional media, social media platforms have also, to a large extent, indicated the potential 
to challenge sovereign power. Grassroots movements have benefited through the Internet, which 
has brought about new possibilities for publics to organise themselves, even under authoritarian 
regimes. Although there is an increase in the censorship and capabilities of the state and/or 
corporates to limit access, shut down the Internet and to criminalise content, Salanova (2012) and 
Benkler (2006) state that the Internet has still proven to be harder for authoritarian regimes to 
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control and censor than traditional media outlets. In Africa, social media networks are 
increasingly becoming mass communication tools and vehicles for mobilisation.  
 
2.8. ARAB SPRING 
Several scholars have argued that the 2010/2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are 
attributable to social media-based tools like Facebook, Twitter and mobile phone technology 
which played an important role in organising, supporting and staging the revolutions (Bohler-
Muller & Van der Merwe, 2011). Although some scholars have highlighted the ability of social 
media to create awareness and mobilise the masses against the status quo, social media 
detractors, such as Regina Salanova (2012), undermine the power of social media, especially as a 
tool for social and political change. While Salanova agrees that social media can have a crucial 
role in coordinating and mobilising grassroots movements, in addition to being useful in forging 
political change, they are neither the actors nor the drivers of a revolution (Salanova, 2011: 8).  
Agreeing with Salanova, Malcom Gladwell (2010)
43
 argues that online social networks (Twitter 
and Facebook) can never yield actual confrontation with forces of injustice due to their large 
proportion of superficial or marginal relationships characterised by „low-intensity‟ emotional 
bonds. According to him, activism comes primarily from strong social connection which 
Facebook and Twitter do not have; hence they are too weak to motivate people into real action 
(ibid). 
However, Salanova and Gladwell‟s views become a highly debatable issue by looking at 
numerous revolutions in the Arab world which are largely attributed to the impact of social 
media in shaping political debates, as well as political and social mobilisation (Yang, 2013: 708). 
These include: the fleeing of Tunisian President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 to Saudi Arabia; 
resignation of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011; the deposition in 
Libya of Muammar Gaddafi on 23 August 2011 (he was later killed on 20 October 2011), and 
the surrendering of power by President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-
Hadi on 27 February 2012 after presidential elections.  
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Other countries, such as Morocco, have seen leaders reforming their constitutions due to the 
wave of uprisings, while other leaders like Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister in Iraq, refrained 
from pursuing re-election. On the other hand, there have been incidents where digital technology 
activism has not materialised into political change, as was the case with the 2007 Saffron 
revolution in Burma in which dozens of protesters were arrested (Fink, 2009). Therefore, 
although social media can have certain impacts on social and political change as mentioned 
above, it is not always the case.   
 
2.9. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH SOCIAL MEDIA 
Although social media has registered some degree of promoting participatory democracy, there 
are some challenges associated with this. Due to this freedom and opportunities created by the 
social media (the coverage and openness), there is often a lack of credibility and trustworthiness 
of the source. With the use of mobile phones, people create fictional identities (Facebook names) 
and they post information and visuals on the Net with long-lasting damage (Usman, 2015: 458). 
With a source‟s credibility doubted, the authenticity of the content may also be doubted; hence, 
posing another challenge as true fact could be distorted on the Net (ibid). 
According to Eisenberg (2013)
44
, there is also the technological disruption challenge posed by 
the social media. Usman (2015) argues that: 
This form of media and mobile revolution is about data, real time velocity and variety of data 
sometimes unstructured (pictures, videos, sentimental analyses, etc) from desperate sources which 
causes indigestion and confusion. Sorting out the information and acting on it so as to meet up the 
demands of the public an organization serves is actually a concern (ibid: 458). 
 
Social media can also be misused by users. There are incidents where users, especially 
politicians, have abused the networks by posting insults and attacking personalities – in most 
cases, contrary to the constitutional provisions of human rights. Additionally, some users post 
pornographic images which pose a serious challenge to moral values (ibid). According to 
conservatives: 
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The sexually explicit content of pornography is an affront to decent family and religious values 
and deeply offensive to a significant portion of citizens who hold these values. The consumption 
of pornography is bad for society. It undermines and destabilizes the moral fabric of a decent and 
stable society, by encouraging sexual promiscuity, deviant sexual practices and other attitudes 
and behaviour that threaten traditional family and religious institutions, and which conservatives 
regard as intrinsically morally wrong. Furthermore, pornography is bad for those who consume it, 
corrupting their character and preventing them from leading a good and worthwhile life in 
accordance with family and religious values (West, 2013: 11).  
Usman (2015) also argues that the sense of diversity/complexity is another challenge associated 
with social media. According to him, social media has cleared the veil of the homogenising trend 
which was previously provided by the traditional media to all age categories. Displacement of 
rugged and reliable media sources (Newspapers, magazines and TV shows) is equally affecting 
computers, as people spend less time on conventional media and concentrate on the social media 
(Pogue, 2015).  
The fate of personal privacy is another challenge in social media. Personal privacy cannot be 
guaranteed in an environment within which diverse types of information can be disseminated 
(Usman, 2015). There are also challenging security concerns, especially considering the increase 
in the occurrence and number of cyber-crimes. Social media can be used to spread political 
messages initiated by insurgents/terrorists (ibid). Other challenging security concerns include 
surveillance of, in particular, political and social activists by state and /corporate entities.   
 
2.10. SOUTH AFRICA AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
According to a South African Social Media Landscape (2011) study by Fuseware (a social media 
monitoring platform) and World Wide Worx (a leading market research company), South Africa 
has seen a growing number of social media users since 2011. By mid-2011, there were 1.1 
million Twitter users, 4.2 million Facebook users and approximately 10 million Mxit users 
registered with the leading social media platform
45
. At the end of August 2012, 5.33 million 
South Africans were using Facebook on the Web; 2.43 million were on Twitter and 9.35 million 
on Mxit (Fuseware & World Wide Worx, 2012). In 2013, 6.8 million Facebook users were 
registered – according to a report by Fuseware and World Wide Worx (2014) – with 5.5 million 
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users on Twitter and 6.3 million users on Mxit. In August 2014, there were 11.8 million 
Facebook users, 6.6 million Twitter users, with 6.5 million Mxit users (Fuseware and World 
Wide Worx 2015) registered; by 2015, there were 14.4 million Facebook users in South Africa, 
7.2 million users on Twitter and no records on Mxit
46
, according to the report by We Are 
Social
47
.  
The (2015) research on gender balance found Facebook to be the first high-technology social 
media platform in South Africa with equal take-up by males and females. Of those Facebook 
users whose gender is identifiable, 5.6 million males and 5.6 females use the platform
48
.  
From the above data, Facebook has shown a consistent increase in the number of users, with the 
biggest margin – compared to other social media platforms – followed by Twitter. Mxit has 
shown a massive decrease in the number of users for the past years. According to an 
investigation by Memeburn (2015), the drop has been due to intense international competition 
and a smartphone revolution, because the success of Mxit was largely built on feature phones
49
.  
 
2.11. FACEBOOK IS THE MOST POPULAR AND INFLUENTIAL SOCIAL 
NETWORKING WEBSITE IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH 12 MILLION MONTHLY 
ACTIVE USERS 
Among social media networks, Facebook is the most popular and influential social networking 
website in South Africa, with 12 million monthly active users. According to Facebook Reports 
First Quarter 2015 results
50
, Facebook is a free social media platform service with a joining age 
limit of over 13 years, provided one has a mobile phone number or an email address (Di Capua, 
2012). On the Facebook website, users create a profile by listing personal information which 
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may include their names, gender, hometown, relationship status, birthday, profile picture, 
educational background, employment situation, lists of personal interests and contact details. 
Users can establish connections with other users by inviting each other to become „friends‟ so 
that they can access the websites of users with whom they have become „friends‟ (Roos & 
Slabbert, 2014: 2847).  
Various activities can be performed on Facebook, including sending private messages through 
inboxes or public messages on each other‟s timelines (Di Capua, 2012:  37). Writing messages 
was found to be one of the most frequent activities on Facebook, according to Golder et al. 
(2007). Users can upload photographs, „tag‟ themselves or other people in the photographs, 
update their „status‟, comment on other users' postings, „poke‟ a friend, indicate that they „like‟ a 
particular posting, and „subscribe‟ to specific users' public postings without necessarily adding 
that user as a friend (Roos & Slabbert, 2014: 2847). 
Facebook has „private settings‟ which enables users to limit their „visibility‟ and the visibility of 
what they post on their „walls‟. They may choose „private‟ so that only those with whom they are 
friends can see whatever they post on their walls; or they may choose „public‟ to make their 
posts visible to everyone, including those who are not their friends. However, although the user 
may utilise several private settings to restrict their visibility, certain information in the profile 
remains visible to everyone. This enables users to recognise each other through the displayed 
information before sending friend requests (ibid).  
 
2.12.  WHY DO PEOPLE JOIN FACEBOOK? 
In trying to understand why people join Facebook, Gangadharbatla (2008) did research to 
explore whether willingness to join social networking websites (in this case Facebook) had to do 
with the need to belong, collective self-esteem and Internet self-efficacy. The hypothesis proved 
that this was the case and this research concluded that these factors may also influence 
individuals‟ attitudes, such as a user‟s personality toward social networking sites. Social 
influence is another element determining people‟s use of Facebook. Teo et al. (2009) conducted 
research among 381 Singaporean respondents whose average age was 25; the following facts 
were established as users‟ direct likeability to join and use Facebook: the number of friends 
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using Facebook, the belief that Facebook is the most popular networking site amongst 
individuals and, finally, that it has the most active users in Singapore and worldwide (ibid).  
Research has also established that people join Facebook for recognition purposes. This was 
found from a study conducted among 438 Facebook users from Hong Kong. Using an online 
survey, Zhang and Tang (2009) studied the relationship between gratifications and different 
Facebook uses and they identified six gratifications that can be regrouped under two categories 
which, according to them, are related to certain degrees of collective self-esteem, which „reflects 
the relevant value an individual “places” on a social group‟ (Zhang & Tang, 2009: 5).  
One of the categories was called social compensation and includes recognition gain, emotional 
support, social network extension and social network maintenance, depending on a response 
from another user. In other words, gratification derived from Facebook enables users to gain and 
maintain recognition from others (ibid).  Personality and willingness to communicate, experience 
and social influence are also some of the reasons established by some researchers to determine 
why people join Facebook (Di Capua, 2012). 
 
2.13.  FACEBOOK USE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A recent 2015 research by We are Social also indicates Facebook as the most popular social 
network in South Africa, with 26% active users, followed by Google+, Twitter, LinkedIn, 
Pinterest and Instagram, respectively51. 
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Table 1 
 
Several studies have concentrated on the use of Facebook to initiate and maintain relationships 
and many researchers have found that Facebook is mostly employed to keep in touch with people 
and to know them better (Joinson, 2008; Golder et al., 2007; Sheldon, 2008; Wiese & Farrugia, 
2009). A survey conducted by Stern and Taylor (2007) among 364 university students found that 
most Facebook users use it to maintain already existing relationships and only a small number of 
users try to meet new people or try to initiate relationships. As Facebook allows instant 
communication between users who are geographically apart, some researchers also found 
Facebook to be frequently used to maintain distant relationships (Golder et al., 2007; Sheldon, 
2008; Dong, 2008). „Facebook may foster relationship building by allowing users to track other 
members of their community‟ (Lampe et al., 2006: 167). Thus, Facebook users may retrieve 
information about their peers on the website, keep track of their activity, read what they write or 
look at what they post on their walls in order to keep in touch with them (Di Capua, 2012: 38). 
While the potential of social media to enhance democracy has been extensively explored in 
western countries, such studies remain virtually unexplored in Africa where democracies are still 
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fresh and where social media has indicated having quite a distinct potential effect on politics.  
However, as mentioned earlier, a new book, titled Participatory Politics and Citizen Journalism 
in a Networked Africa, is an example of new research coming out of the continent on citizen 
journalism and social media. This research paper aims to delve into this relatively understudied 
field to explore how South African publics used Facebook to express their views on 
Nkandlagate. Facebook has been chosen due to its popularity as a social networking platform 
among South Africans. Central to this research are the kinds of discourse that emerged from the 
posts and their meanings. 
 
2.14.  POWER INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TO POLITICIANS: BENEFITS 
AND CHALLENGES 
 
The growth of social networking sites such as MySpace, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, wikis, 
blogs and Instagram has been one of the notable trends on the Internet. There has been an 
increase in their utilisation by political parties (Lynch & Hogan, 2012: 84).  Mackay, (2010: 23) 
states that Web 2.0 (World Wide Websites that emphasise user-generated content, usability, and 
interoperability) provides an opportunity for voters to engage themselves in a real online 
dialogue with their representatives which, as argued by Briones et al. (2011), provides the 
possibility of relationship building. Such relationship cultivation between parties and voters 
enables the fostering of positive attitudes towards the parties (Seltzer & Zhang, 2011: 42).  
According to Wellman et al. (2001), there is a greater likelihood for people who are involved in 
online political activities to be involved in similar activities offline, a view shared by Verba et al. 
(1995: 345), who argue that „publics who are interested in politics are more likely to be 
politically active‟ in terms of participating in contesting as political leaders, voting for political 
leaders, as well as involving themselves in the formation of public policy. According to Tolbert 
and McNeal (2003: 175), there is evidence that advancement in communication technology may 
play an important role in influencing electoral behavior.  
The explosion of media outlets on the Internet has led to a fragmented information environment, 
in what is described by Bennett and Iyengar (2008: 717) as „stratamentation‟ (stratification and 
simultaneous fragmentation). One of the notable trends in the growth of social media networks is 
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the increase in their utilisation by political parties (Lynch & Hogan, 2012: 84). According to 
Zhang and Seltzer (2010: 164), „the Internet is a powerful tool for stimulating political 
participation‟. Social media enable candidates to communicate directly with publics, keeping 
control of the content, distribution and timing of their messages, as well as reducing their 
dependence on traditional intermediaries, such as journalists. Social media has been very 
influential in helping new or less established parties get their voice heard (Moe & Larsson, 
2013). 
The first electoral campaign in which the use of social media had a decisive impact was Barack 
Obama‟s 2008 US presidential campaign52 . The core of the web-based campaign was a well-
designed, versatile and dynamic website: „my.barackobama.com‟ (MyBO). According to the 
European Business Review (2010), through the campaign‟s social network, people were 
connecting to each other and activating themselves on behalf of the campaign. The result was the 
creation of two million profiles. Over 200,000 offline events were planned by registered users 
and volunteers; these users also wrote 400,000 blog posts and created 35,000 volunteer groups. 
Obama raised $639 million from 3 million donors, mostly through the Internet (Vargas, 2008). 
Volunteers on MyBO generated $30 million on 70,000 personal fundraising pages
53
 and donors 
made 6.5 million donations online, totalling more than $500 million. Of those donations, 6 
million were amounts of $100 or less, the average being $80. The average donor gave more than 
once. Obama‟s campaign garnered 5 million supporters on social networks. By November 2008, 
Obama had approximately 2.5 million (some sources say 3.2 million)
54
 Facebook supporters, 
outperforming McCain by nearly four times. Obama had over 115,000 followers on Twitter – 
more than 23 times those of McCain. Fifty million viewers spent 14 million hours watching 
campaign-related videos on YouTube – four times McCain‟s viewers55. The campaign had sent 
out 1 billion emails, including 10,000 unique messages targeted at specific segments of their 13 
million member list. The campaign had garnered 3 million mobile and SMS subscribers. Apart 
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from using social media tools more effectively than other candidates to organise, communicate 
and fundraise, the campaign also leveraged them to support its grassroots strategy that tapped 
into the hearts of the voters. The result was a victory for both the Democrats and Obama and 
became the legacy of one of the most effective Internet marketing plans in history, where social 
media and technology enabled the individual to activate and participate in a movement (Lewin, 
2008). Evidence has it that Obama‟s victory in the 2008 elections through social media has 
influenced many political parties to seriously involve themselves in social media platforms 
worldwide
56
. During the 2007 French presidential elections, social media demonstrated a strong 
influence towards the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party‟s Nicolas 
Sarkozy‟s election results, when he scored a decisive victory over the opposing socialist 
candidate, Ségolène Royal, for the French presidency. Over 40% of Internet users reported that 
their voting decision was due to the conversations and other activities on the Internet. In the 
Finnish parliamentary election of 2011, clear evidence indicates that the True Finns were the first 
party to succeed in using social media to mobilise their supporters in Finland. Other significant 
political events in which social media played a crucial part include the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
this happen. This happened in a large, populated and traditionally Arab state in which the 
transition of power in Egypt was the most significant change in the so-called Arab Spring. The 
chain of events leading up to it was quite intense
57
.  
 
2.15. SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
In the South African 2014 elections, political parties, such as the EFF, Democratic Alliance (DA) 
and the ANC, saw an increase in their votes, partly due to their usage of social media platforms. 
The official social media audience of Julius Malema, the EFF leader, was built from scratch over 
a period of a year and showed exponential growth. According to the CEO of Apurimac Media, 
Will Green, the Apurimac research showed that DA and its leader, Helen Zille, had the nimblest 
Twitter fingers. The party registered 734 tweets and Zille had a total of 634 tweets in the third 
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week of April, while the ANC recorded the biggest Facebook growth: from 52,536 likes to 
136,046 likes from 7 March to 2 May 2014. Lupia and Philpot (2005: 1124) argue that the 
increase in people‟s political interest on the web is due to the web‟s potential to allow people to 
post, at a minimal cost, content that can be viewed all over the world. South Africans used their 
personal social networks or news and political websites to share their own political viewpoints 
during the 2014 elections. 
Freedom House (FH)
58
 did a survey to assess youth attitudes towards democracy and its core 
ingredients of voting, accountability and political parties‟ actions to tap into the youth‟s political 
orientations n South Africa. The report, which was compiled by Susan Booysen
59
, involved 12 
political parties, the biggest five being the ANC, DA, EFF, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the 
National Freedom Party (NFP). Within the survey, political parties explained their experiences in 
using social media for the 2014 elections, with Twitter, Facebook, Mxit, WhatsApp, Google 
broadcasts and podcasts being the mostly used.  
The key findings were that the „political parties vary in impressions as to the specificity (or not) 
of issues that concern the youth. The issues are both substantive (concerning aspects of public 
policy and government action) and procedural (relevant to participation in elections and politics). 
Some parties claim all of their policies are youth-centric; others focus on issues that concern the 
youth specifically, including education, work opportunities, gangsterism, community safety or 
substance abuse‟ (FH, 2015: 1). With regard to social media usage, the findings of the interviews 
with political parties were that social media provided multiple benefits for strengthening 
representative democracy in South Africa, including: providing access to politicians; satisfying 
citizens‟ needs for information and expanding awareness of party political options; offering two-
way, interactive communication; contributing to „direct democracy‟; helping to ascertain 
responses to government actions; enabling politicians to identify new pressing issues, and 
assisting in demystifying politics and enlarging citizen participation. Furthermore, social media 
could help enhance party capacity for outreach due to cost efficiency. To illustrate, audiences of 
substantial size could be reached with minimal technical output costs attached to postings (ibid). 
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Although South African politicians used social media for campaigning in the 2014 elections, this 
FH report indicates that most of the parties were not very well-acquainted with the use of social 
media; they were either learning in the process or employing expertise to help them improve 
their skills (FH, 2015: 11). However, smaller parties were unable to keep their social media 
platforms afloat after the elections, due to lack of enough internal staff to continue the learning 
process (ibid). 
The table below indicates Twitter and Facebook as the preferred social media platforms for 
political parties.  Political parties considered factors such as „ease of access, cost of usage, ability 
of the medium to carry out its message, having approximate control over the communication 
dissemination and whether their target youth audiences will relate to the fashion status of the 
application‟ (FH, 2015: 12). The table depicts some trends that are also highly seasonal. It was 
difficult to sustain great or fair social media use after election time, especially by small parties – 
one of which was the NFP.  Although the NFP was able to create trends on Twitter – using their 
experts, of course, which helped to increase their following and created awareness of the leader‟s 
speeches and details of the leader‟s campaign trail – the party failed to sustain the platform in the 
post-election period.  
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2.16.  THE RANGE OF POLITICAL PARTIES’ SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE  
 
Table 2 
Party Facebook Twitter Mxit Whatsapp YouTube Broadcasting 
on Facebook 
Webpage 
ANC A (1) A A (4) A (1) A A A 
DA A (2) A A    A 
EFF A A  A (3)  A (3) A 
IFP A A     A 
NFP A A     A 
Key: A= high level; a= modest level 
1. To call meetings and to create groups 
2. Facebook gets hacked, becomes too impersonal once you go over 5,000; hundreds of small DA 
Facebook profiles 
3. Good for groups, to debate issues, on land; Skype-like interviews on Facebook 
4. The ANC created MyANC on Mxit 
Source: FH, 2015: 12 
The DA also indicated awareness of possible incoherence that could happen due to the openness 
of DA political leaders Tweeting or Facebooking using the party‟s name. To overcome such 
dangers, the DA created a strong national party social media page as a common forum for all 
political discussions to serve as its voice.   
 
2.17. BARRIERS TO THE USAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA (ibid) 
Multiple barriers were highlighted by all the parties who were involved in social media (FH: 
2015: 12). The recorded barriers are experienced by all political parties, although at different 
levels.  The ANC was seemingly the most aware of the risks associated with social media (ibid).  
Below is a table indicating all the barriers faced. 
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Table 3 
Level General aspect Specific Illustration 
Infrastructural [National level]  No mobile phone signal in 
remote areas 
The majority rural areas suffer 
this problem 
Affordability and familiarity 
[Personal level] 
No access to smartphones, a 
prerequisite to social media 
With high poverty and 
unemployment rate the majority 
cannot afford smartphones 
Skill/low familiarity [personal 
level] 
Supporters have access to phones 
but without matching level skills 
Language and literacy or tech 
literacy constraints  
Party political resources  Low human resource capacity to 
facilitate social media use 
Party finances do not permit 
more extensive HR to facilitate; 
for example, in terms of persons 
to generate trending or for poster 
design.  
Hostile political environment  Social media use is public, and 
false messaging or the possibility 
for infiltration  
 
 
Apart from the barriers in relation to social media listed in the table above, small political parties 
also lamented about the barriers they face to use traditional media (ibid: 13).  
 
2.18.  CONCLUSION 
 
According to the literature review, social media are not ubiquitous and access to them is highly 
differentiated globally, as richer individuals and countries have faster Internet access, enabling 
them to use much more creative social media than those countries and individuals without 
access.  However, this being the case, the conclusion derived from the literature review is that 
new media/social media has provided both publics and political parties in South Africa with 
some degree of democracy through freedom of expression.  
The next section will be the theoretical framework underpinning this study. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. NETWORKED PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
This research is framed through the networked public sphere theory, as it examines social media 
networks, particularly Facebook, with the main theories deployed by Yochai Benkler (2006).   
Benkler (2006) defined the networked public sphere as the set of social spaces in which publics 
discuss and develop opinions on social and political issues, eventually coalescing into public 
opinion. He argued that networked public spheres, such as the Internet, provide a distinguished 
set of potential benefits, as it is harder for governments to control communications due to the 
highly distributed networked architecture of the Internet. This makes the networked public 
sphere different to and advantageous over traditional media which are easier targets for capture 
and control by the government, due to their reliance on a small number of technical and 
organisational points of control (Benkler, 2006: 266). 
Ever since the general public began to access the Internet soon after its emergence in the early 
1990s, scholars, activists, politicians, journalists and ordinary publics have debated the Internet„s 
potential effect on society at large, particularly its impact on political systems and its potential 
for deepening democracy. Many theorists hailed electronically networked political 
communication – especially the World Wide Web – as the solution to problems created by the 
top-down, one-way mass mediated system through which most publics could participate in 
political systems (Barlow, 1996; McManus, 1992). A number of critical theorists, such as Curran 
(2000), Habermas (1989) and McChesney (1999), have shown that the traditional mass media 
(print and broadcasting) have largely failed in their role as public spheres. In contrast, this role is 
being fulfilled by the Internet which offers publics the opportunity to encounter and engage with 
a huge diversity of positions, according to some theorists (Gimmler, 2001; Kellner, 2004).  
However, there are a great number of theorists who do not fully ascribe to the claims articulated 
towards the Internet by other theorists. Dahlberg (2001, 2005b), Gomez (2004), and Murdock 
and Golding (2004) have pointed out significant factors – for example, inequalities in access and 
participation, un-reflexive communication, corporate domination of online attention, state 
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surveillance and censorship. Further, they critique validity claims locally, nationally and 
internationally as limiting open and reflexive debate online. 
Although there are some doubts about the Internet as a public sphere, this research will focus on 
the aspects that have to a large extent made the Internet function better as a public sphere, 
bearing in mind that it has managed to function better as a public sphere when compared to 
modern mass communication (newspapers and broadcasting). Many Internet supporters took on 
board the work of Jürgen Habermas‟s philosophical communitarian political theory in their 
celebration of the emancipatory potential of the Internet; he stressed the crucial importance of the 
public sphere for a free society governed by deliberative democratic consensus-building. In order 
to understand the Internet as a public sphere, this research discusses some concepts concerning 
the public sphere, based on the work of Habermas, and includes other arguments about the public 
sphere and how the Internet is a public sphere. 
The idea of a public sphere has not only had a long history, but also a distinguished and 
conceptual one. Political philosophers from the time of Aristotle have contemplated the 
relationship amongst publics, between publics and the state and between publics and political 
society (Koçan, 2008). One of the best known sociologists and philosophers in the tradition of 
critical theory and pragmatism on the public sphere is Habermas (1989). Habermas (1962) traces 
the concepts of „public‟ and „private‟ back to ancient Greece and then through the hierarchical 
world of the Middle Ages, where public and private had no separate existence.  
The development of a modern state and economy has resulted in the current recognition of public 
and private, although not homogeneous. „Public‟ relates to public authority of the state, and 
„private‟ relates to the economy in capitalist societies, society and the family. Depending on a 
secular nature of the polity, public and private are defined and separated in terms of law and of 
institutions. They serve as characteristic functions of the public and private realms. The public 
sphere exists as part of the private world that moves into the public domain (Habermas, 1962: 4). 
The two terms lost their distinction with the key shift in the modern world, such that interest 
groups from either side of the public-private divide operate together. „Public and private are 
replaced by one massive “societal” complex that is in some respects like the feudal state of the 
Middle Ages. In this context, the public sphere in its traditional form is no longer possible‟ (ibid: 
5). Public sphere, as defined by Habermas (1989), is the „realm of our social life in which 
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something approaching public opinion can be formed where access is guaranteed to all publics‟ 
(ibid: 102). This theory will assist this research because it resonates with the public sphere that 
Facebook is becoming in South Africa, especially in relation to the Nkandla saga. 
Habermas (1962) formed the basis of the „structural transformation theory‟ in which he describes 
„the process by which the public sphere shifts from being the centre of rational-critical debate, 
embedded within the constitution and within society, to being a debased version of its former 
self‟ (ibid: 5). According to Habermas, this shift was being dictated solely by social, economic 
and political structures which were changing in form and function. Such structural changes 
include institutions like coffee houses and salons, which are economic structures. In South 
Africa, Facebook and the discussion on Nkandla could be seen as a Habermas public sphere. 
In „The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere‟, Habermas argues that „publicness (or 
publicity) of representation did not constitute a social realm (that is as how a public sphere was 
meant to be), but rather, it was something like a status attribute whereby [T]he manorial lord 
displayed and presented himself as an embodiment of some “higher” power. It had nothing to do 
with the representation of people as is the case when either a lawyer represents his/her client or a 
member of the national assembly represents a nation‟ (ibid: 7). Habermas goes on to argue that 
in the Middle Ages of European society, there was no indication of a public sphere as a „unique 
realm distinct from the private sphere‟ (1989: 103) and each power division operated as sheer 
spectators of those above their authority. The feudal landlord publicly represented his power 
where the lord and the estate of the realm was the land, „instead of merely functioning as 
deputies for it, they represent their power before the people, instead of for the people‟ (ibid: 
103). 
With time and some political changes in European society, this kind of feudalism collapsed in 
the eighteenth century and paved the way for the bourgeois to take centre stage. Habermas 
(1989) examined the bourgeois public sphere of 18th century Europe as: 
The sphere in which private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere 
regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the 
general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor (ibid: 27). 
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Habermas's account of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere, stressing its claim to be 
open and accessible to all, has triggered many controversies. One of the biggest and most 
important critiques of the Habermasian public sphere is the lack of inclusion/diversity and its 
focus on the elite; for example, its gender-biased nature (excluding women from the public) and 
its exclusion of the proletariat from the public sphere. In this research, Benkler‟s networked 
public sphere is important because Facebook has presented the South Africa publics with access 
to the Internet, a networked communication public sphere through which online discussions on 
Nkandla take place. 
 
3.2. CRITICS OF HABERMAS 
Critiques of Habermas‟s universality of the public sphere – such as Hauser (1999) – have 
attempted to extend or re-imagine the concept of the public to „Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric 
of Publics and Public Spheres‟ in which „rhetoric is central to the concept of the public sphere‟, 
in contrast to Habermas‟s idealistic notion of the bourgeois public sphere.  Hauser came up with 
this discourse-based model of the public sphere by exploring the discursive dimensions of 
publics, public spheres and public opinions.  Hauser argues that a „vernacular rhetorical model‟ 
that allows for partisan rhetoric does not attempt to conceal multiple publics and marginalised 
voices as is the case with the bourgeois public sphere (Hauser, 1999: 11). Others, like Oskar 
Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993), introduced the notion of an oppositional public sphere to 
ideologically compete with the bourgeois public sphere, as manifested in proletariat public 
sphere.  Similarly, critics such as Jean-François Lyotard (1984) argue about the potential of 
Habermas‟s public sphere being emancipated in The Postmodern Condition in the Capitalist 
Political Economy, in which knowledge is controlled in highly computerised societies, how it is 
represented as a game of language and the way „universal knowledge‟ is „delegitimised‟ 
(Lyotard, 1984: 81). Additionally, feminist theorists have argued about the continued gender-
biased nature of Habermas‟s public sphere (Fraser, 1990; Landes, 1988).  
In this research, Facebook is regarded as a public sphere, as it has offered such a space to South 
African publics where everyone with access could participate in the critical political debates and 
discussions on Nkandla.  
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Habermas‟s contemporaries at the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
(1995), have critically analysed the downfall of critical debate and the emergence of a cultural 
notion of leisure. Their views are based on a Marxist argument which suggests that „the ideas of 
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas‟ (Marx & Engels, 1976: 59). Horkheimer and 
Adorno argue that the change is a direct result of the mass-produced and mechanically 
reproduced culture, manufactured through structural changes in cultural industries. In their 
analysis, Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that the „man with leisure has to accept what the 
cultural manufacturers offer him‟ (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1995: 74). This is an argument which, 
in a Marxist context, means that the class which controls the means of material production also 
controls the means of mental production, whereby the ideas of those who lack the means of 
production are subject to it.   
However, Habermas pointed out three important institutional criteria he recognises as the 
preconditions for a public sphere to exist. These include: 1) disregard of status; 2) common 
concern; and 3) inclusivity (Habermas, 1989: 36-37).  
This chapter will now discuss these concepts which have value for this research into Nkandla 
and Facebook. 
 Disregard of status: The purpose of the public sphere is the establishment of an 
objective forum free from state control or any authority of rank and status. Disregarding 
status will emancipate the public sphere, thereby asserting a uniformity arena of 
„common humanity‟ for better arguments.  
 Common concern: Before the development of the public sphere, there used to be a 
monopoly of interpretation in the fields of literature, philosophy and art, with such 
authority being vested in the hands of churches and the state. This culture continued even 
at a time of specific spheres‟ adherence to the rational thinking emanating from 
capitalism development where there was more information required – a period when 
philosophy, literature works and art became commercialised and were accessible to 
private publics who could afford them. These items ceased to be components of the 
churches‟ and courts‟ publicity of representation. These cultural products became 
accessible to private individuals who now had the responsibility to determine their 
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meanings and communicate rationally with others. „Cultural products and information in 
terms of philosophy, literature and art works thus became the common concern of private 
publics and this paved the way for other issues of common concern to be introduced as 
topics of deliberation‟ (ibid: 36). 
 Inclusivity: Even at times when the public strengthened its boundaries to exclude people, 
it was never able to fully close itself to disallow participation. The public always 
understood and found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of private 
individuals who – insofar as they were propertied and educated – as readers, listeners, 
and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to 
discussion. Issues discussed, which were previously confined to the debates amongst 
secluded groups, now became general in their significance and accessibility. Thus, 
everybody had to and was able to participate. Wherever the public established itself 
institutionally as a stable group of discussants, it did not equate itself with the public but 
at most claimed to act as its mouthpiece and to form the bourgeois representation.   
The public sphere was always conscious of being part of a larger part and acting as a 
representative group of that larger public even when the first public spheres developed as 
specific groups of people. The potential of it being a publicist body was evident as its 
discussions did not merely remain internal but could be directed to the outside world 
(Habermas, 1989: 37). These are some of the points used by Habermasians to explain 
how new media technologies such as the Internet/social media could fulfill the conditions 
of a public sphere as a forum for critical and rational debate (Wilhelm, 2000; Hoar & 
Hope, 2002). This research discusses to what extent the publics‟ use of Facebook to 
critique the President‟s homestead spending on Nkandla operated in this way.  
 
From the mid-2000s, there has been an extensive amount of work performed in Habermas‟s 
name regarding the Internet and the public sphere.  However, Habermas‟s keynote speech on the 
remark he made to the International Communication Association in 2006 regarding the claims 
that had been made in his name since the early 1990s about the Internet, triggered yet another 
debate between Habermas and the pro-Internet post-Habermasians (Geiger, 2009). According to 
Habermas: 
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The Internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers. 
However, computer-mediated communication in the web can claim unequivocal democratic merits 
only for a special context: It can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to 
control and repress public opinion. In the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of 
fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but 
politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics. Within established 
national public spheres, the online debates of web users only promote political communication, 
when news groups crystallize around the focal points of the quality press, for example, national 
newspapers and political magazines (Habermas, 2006: 423). 
 
His speech was regarded by many Habermasians, such as Howard Rheingold (2007) and Axel 
Bruns (2007), as rather unsatisfying, especially when he defended the existence of media 
professionals and even the media elite, arguing that they are essential for the proper operation of 
the public sphere.  Rheingold‟s view is that „Habermas does not understand the Internet, the 
implications and the phenomenon he is critiquing‟: 
Habermas, a man whose theory of communicative action places high priority on precision of 
communication describes Internet discourse as a series of chat rooms, which is a telltale that he 
doesn„t understand the phenomenon he is describing. Certainly, the Internet hosts chat rooms, 
many of which are the site of political discussion of varying degrees of rationality and civility. But 
as millions of people know, there are mailing lists, wiki talk pages, blogs and blog comments, and 
message boards as well. What I wish Habermas had said, since he clearly does not understand a 
phenomenon that is central to the applicability of his theory in the 21st century, is I leave that work 
to younger scholars (Rheingold, 2007: 10). 
 
Although Habermas‟s work on the bourgeois public sphere – including his view on the Internet 
as a public sphere – has received a lot of criticism, many theorists have used most of his ideas to 
link the Internet as a public sphere. This research also argues for the Internet as a public sphere 
in its examination of Facebook users and Nkandla. Habermas‟s public sphere has developed into 
a networked public sphere, with the Internet having the potential for being an expansive and a 
more inclusive public sphere. His three criteria (disregarding status, common concern and 
inclusivity) for a public sphere to exist are at least to some extent adhered to within the Internet.  
 
3.3. THE NETWORK SOCIETY 
In contemporary communication, the Internet has been heralded by many theorists as arguably 
the most important development to have produced a global public sphere to enable people, in 
theory, to have direct access to a global forum without mediation, selection or censorship to their 
arguments and expression (Papacharissi, 2002; Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001; Rheingold, 2007; 
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Bruns, 2007; Benkler, 2006). This research uses the work of Yochai Benkler (2006) as the main 
theorist, based on the context of his networked public sphere, because it relates more to this 
research in the sense that Facebook offers a more public and „democratic‟ space to those South 
African publics with access, which enables them to communicate their observations and their 
viewpoints on Nkandla to many others without the control of media owners. In addition, it is not 
as easily corruptible by money as are the mass media.  
In this research, Facebook has also shown that it provides the South African publics with access, 
freedom of speech, especially that of a politically critical nature, which can be seen in 
discussions on Nkandla. The networked public sphere theoretical framework draws on the 
premise that low-cost networked technologies provide individuals a space to interact with their 
democracy and to experience their roles as publics in participating in political activities and that 
this applies not only to the sharing of information and opinion, but also to engaging in 
communities and in collective action. Using social media tools, individuals are free to observe, 
report, question and debate, not only in principle, but in actual capability. Networked public 
spheres also serve as watchdogs over society on a peer-production model.  Although the Internet 
and social media can be censored or even shut down in some cases, it has still proven harder for 
governments to control communications, due to the highly distributed networked architecture; 
hence, it provides a distinguished set of potential benefits as a public sphere (Benkler, 2007).  
Benkler‟s contributions on the networked public sphere have made his fellow theorists, such as 
Rheingold (2007), recommend him as the leader of a new post-Habermasian era of research on 
the Internet. Through his literature, Benkler has contributed to the new knowledge about the 
Internet as a public sphere, particularly in his work on the unified public sphere (Geiger, 2009). 
What differentiates Benkler from most previous readers of Habermas is his acknowledgement of 
the role of the public sphere in facilitating collective will/opinion formation between the 
otherwise incommensurable life worlds or discourse communities (Geiger, 2009: 18). His book, 
The Wealth of Networks (2007), has been characterised as taking up the Habermasian lineage in 
a new, digital age (Geiger, 2009). Benkler‟s re-forming of the Habermasian public sphere into 
the networked public sphere is based on what he terms „coordinate effects‟, the spontaneously-
emergent macro-properties a network exhibits simply due to the ability of any user to interact 
with any other user. Benkler„s key argument is that the mass-mediated public sphere must give 
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way to the networked public sphere (one mediated through computer networks instead of the 
modern media forms of newspaper and television); the reason being that the mass mediated 
public sphere has systematically failed to provide people with an authentic, democratic space 
(Benkler, 2006).  
Filtering, accreditation, synthesis, and salience are created through a system of peer review by 
information affinity groups, topical or interest based. These groups filter the observations and 
opinions of an enormous range of people, and transmit those that pass local peer review to broader 
groups and ultimately to the polity more broadly, without recourse to market-based points of 
control over the information flow. Intense interest and engagement by small groups that share 
common concerns, rather than lowest-common denominator interest in wide groups that are largely 
alienated from each other, is what draws attention to statements and makes them more visible. This 
makes the emerging networked public sphere more responsive to intensely held concerns of a much 
wider swath of the population than the mass media were capable of seeing, and creates a 
communications process that is more resistant to corruption by money (ibid:  242).  
 
Seemingly, one of the key features of the public sphere from a limited view of the Habermasian 
vision of society could certainly be achieved through the Internet‟s transportation of personal 
stories about the effects of politics from the people‟s opinion in their life world to the political 
system (Geiger, 2009). Additionally, that the Internet has produced a significant number of 
spaces that enable non-coercive discourse is not sufficient; Benkler is also one of the first to 
seriously tackle the issue of the synthesis of public opinion across the entire web (ibid: 18).  
Benkler sees the „emergence of low-cost networked technologies, chiefly the Internet, as 
ushering in an entirely new type of networked public sphere with far-reaching implications‟ 
(Benkler, 2006: 270).  
According to Benkler, with a networked public sphere, individuals are provided a space to 
interact with their democracy and experience their roles as publics.  Using social media-based 
tools, everyone with access is free to observe, report, question and debate, not only in principle, 
but in actual capability (ibid: 272). Additionally, a networked public sphere serves as a watchdog 
over society on a peer-production model (ibid: 265). Thus, Benkler‟s networked public sphere 
could perhaps be best understood as distinct to the previously mass-mediated public sphere.  The 
highly distributed networked architecture of the Internet makes it harder to be controlled by the 
government, as opposed to that of traditional media (ibid: 266).  Since the initial publication of 
Benkler‟s book in 2005, it has quickly become the de facto theoretical text for those celebrating 
the demise of the mass media at the hands of the Internet.  
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A number of theorists, including Rheingold (2007) and Bruns (2007), have cited Benkler„s work 
in their refutations of Habermas„s 2006 criticisms of the Internet.  Benkler‟s view is shared by 
Castells (2009), who calls the society that we live in the network society. Castells argues that the 
network society is characterised by mass self-communication, which he defines as „a new form 
of interactive communication, characterised by the capacity of sending multiple messages to 
multiple receiver social movements having a greater chance to enter the public sphere due to its 
autonomy from the mainstream media and its horizontal structure‟ (Castells, 2009: 55). Social 
movements can distribute their images and messages which can be disseminated via multiple 
outlets, ranging from social media to the mainstream media by means of mass self-
communication. This way, social and political change can be endorsed by social movements and 
insurgent politics, even „if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial 
resources or symbolic legitimacy‟ (Castells, 2009: 302). Although Facebook is not free from 
certain factors that cost access such as market commodisation, the South African publics with 
access are able to use Facebook and freely discuss the Nkandlagate saga, as Facebook is free 
from South African government censorship.  
Although some critical theorists like Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) have some reservations about the 
Internet‟s capabilities of having the full potential of a public sphere, they agree that the role 
played by the Internet is facilitating more open inter-discursive contestation (Dahlberg, 2007: 
841). In support of this view, Dahlberg gives an example of the Minnesota e-Democracy 
(www.e-democracy. org)
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 project which attempted to facilitate online debate between diverse 
voices. The Minnesota e-Democracy achieved its rationalist consensus-orientated deliberative 
model by structuring a rational form of deliberation through its rules, management and design. 
This online achievement is behind cyber activist or „hacktivist‟ methods, which  
…bring excluded discourse to attention in the „mainstream‟ public sphere, methods including email 
spamming, denial of service attacks on Internet servers, site defacements that leave behind protest 
messages and parody sites diverting attention to counter-discursive spaces.  These actions enable 
exclusions of dominant discourse to be confronted in ways that are not ignored as easily as 
„reasonable‟ discussion can be. Such activism is seen largely as illegitimate („partisan‟ and 
„unreasonable‟) by consensus-oriented deliberate democrats (Dahlberg, 2009: 841) 
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50 
 
In South Africa, characterised by social-economic inequalities which are the basis for the digital 
divide that create exclusions and the focus of this research, the Internet becomes a public sphere 
due to its capability to allow many people to use it. Many people – such as citizen journalists, 
web-based interest groups and other organisations – use the mass communication medium to 
explore and use the information available on the Internet. These groups are often ignored by 
mainstream media and „the Internet thus reinforces the idea that new media can open up new 
channels of communication and instigate new forms of public discourse and ultimately public 
opinion‟ (Debatim, 2008: 65-66). It is for such Internet capabilities that almost all opposition 
parties in South Africa are able to make their voices heard by their supporters (Freedom House, 
2015). Social media has the potential to form a public sphere for the dissemination of counter 
hegemonic discourse, or to mobilise public opinion outside the centralised authoritative state 
control. 
However, in South Africa mass media continues to play a central role in the public sphere, as 
print and broadcast media still enjoy large audiences. Furthermore, mass media have also 
embraced the networked media phenomenon, not just by delivering news through new media 
channels, but also having large media corporations controlling many of the most popular social 
media platforms (Salanova, 2012). Certainly, Benkler‟s networked public sphere, which is more 
related to this research, remains a critical alternative space for massive public discourse; hence 
presenting significant improvements over one dominated by commercial mass media. Because of 
the dual nature in which the multiplicity of autonomous discursive collectives is united and 
synthesised by uncoordinated coordinate effects, the Internet has allowed the citizenry to 
perform the only task that matters in such a conception of the Habermasian public sphere: giving 
publics a space to form their own opinions through mutual discourse, with little or no coercion or 
manipulation by the corporate capital (Benkler, 2006).  In the specific case of Nkandlagate, this 
research uses Benkler‟s theoretical concepts to examine how South Africans with access to 
internet have demonstrated their democratic rights on Facebook as a networked public sphere to 
articulate their views  based on what the ruling ANC and the major opposition EFF are saying 
concerning Nkandlagate.  
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3.4. CONCEPTS USED IN THIS RESEARCH 
Benkler (2006) portrays the networked public sphere as an online space where members of 
society can cooperate, present political opinions and collectively serve as watchdogs over 
society; all through an online, cooperative, peer-produced model that is less subject to state 
authority than the traditional media. Ideally, the networked public sphere is „a system where 
anyone can participate and where a system of collective filtration highlights issues of greatest 
concern and that warrant collective action or recognition‟ (Alexanyan et al., 2012: 6). This 
system allows for a shift towards more bottom-up than top-down agenda setting.  
3.4.1. Democracy 
Amy Troolin
61
 defines democracy as the type of government or political system ruled by publics. 
In a democracy, people who are members of a society (publics) hold some level of power and 
authority and they actively participate in the political or decision-making process of their 
government. Democracy has been selected as a concept to look at closely in this research and it 
concerns the freedom that people have in order to participate in political matters relating to party 
politics or a political system as determined by the voting public, via the Internet; in this case 
Facebook. Democracy using the Internet is what is also termed as „electronic democracy‟ (Street, 
2001: 214). Advocates of electronic democracy argue that the „Internet stimulates the growth of 
macro public spheres‟, since one segment of the world population uses the Internet to „generate 
controversies‟ (Keane, 2000: 67) about matters of common concern with other members of the 
virtual community. The Internet has contributed to greater knowledge and equality for those with 
access (Street, 2001: 217). This research will look at Facebook as providing the forum for 
discussion or interaction between political parties and publics. Using Facebook, publics can 
exercise their vote, deliberate on public policy or participate directly‟ (ibid: 218). Keane (2000: 
67) suggests that websites like Facebook provide infrastructure for deliberation, which may 
eventually lead to real actions. This research uses Benkler‟s networked public sphere to make 
some findings regarding democracy and public sphere.  
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3.4.2. Networked public sphere 
This research focuses on Facebook as a networked public sphere due to its highly developed 
modes of computer-mediated communication. As of the fourth quarter of 2015, Facebook had 
1.59 billion monthly active users globally, according to the Facebook 2015 Report. Also, 968 
million people logged onto Facebook daily in June 2015, which represents a 17% increase over a 
year. A total of 1.3 million pieces of content are shared on Facebook by people every minute of 
every day.  Among social media networks, Facebook is the most popular and influential social 
networking website in South Africa, with 12 million monthly active users (those which have 
logged in to Facebook during the last 30 days) – according to Facebook 2015 First Quarter 
Reports 2015 results (Facebook, 2015). The most popular Facebook activity is instant 
messaging; hence, these statistics represent Facebook as a contributor to a healthy public sphere. 
In this research, Facebook is viewed in a positive light as the reviver of the public sphere, since it 
enables networks of individuals from the „local‟ to participate in a network of the „global‟, where 
everyone with access functions as a multitude without such boundaries as race, age, class and 
gender.  Facebook in South Africa will also be discussed in this research as „a social space in 
which speakers may express their views to others and who in turn respond to them and raise their 
own opinions and concerns‟ (Bohman 2004: 133). It could be suggested that the political 
engagement of South African publics through Facebook‟s computer-mediated communication in 
this research reveals that there has been a revival of the public sphere online where the data 
about Nkandla is scrutinised. 
3.4.3. Watchdog 
The concept of watchdog in relation to the media concerns how the media is supposed to serve as 
a controller of powerful sectors of society, including leaders within the private and public 
domains (Forbes, 2005).  Media are considered a „fourth estate‟ and as a powerful „watchdog‟, 
which is used for revealing mistreatments of state authority; in particular, protecting the 
democratic and constitutional rights of publics (Stone & O‟Donnell, 1997). Journalists are 
expected by the general public to guard the public interest and to protect it from incompetence, 
corruption and misinformation. However, although the media often promotes transparency, 
especially in autocracies, journalists often face serious constraints and obstacles in this regard 
due to lack of editorial independence. Critics of mass media (newspapers, radio, TV) argue that 
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the mass media have usually worked under certain kinds of influence, such as the government or 
advertisers, and hence the available empirical evidence suggests that they have been unable to 
fully fulfill their watchdog role. This is because the mass media is more easily censored and 
controlled than the Internet, although under the same influences. Several examples are illustrated 
in this research about how publics have come together online to push back against abuses of the 
state or powerful corporate interests. This research also identifies how Facebook is being used by 
South African publics in fulfilling the watchdog role to address problems of common concerns, 
such as Nkandlagate. This research argues that the South African publics with access to internet 
and journalists are now playing more of a watchdog role than before through the opportunities 
which Facebook presents.  
3.4.4. Public opinion 
In political science, the concept of public opinion refers to the aggregate of public attitudes or 
beliefs about government and its political systems (Bianco & Canon, 2013). The term was 
introduced by James Madison: a democratic government needs to have strong and 
knowledgeable publics who hold educated opinions that could be shared and expressed (ibid). 
Active, knowledgeable publics could then participate in their government while also informing 
others of current issues. Public opinion is considered to be the factor that guides an indirect 
democratic government and is considered a dynamic part of today‟s democratic government; it 
has the power and influence to shape the government in new ways. This research deploys the 
concepts by Habermas and Benkler to discuss how Facebook enabled a public sphere through 
public discussions, debates and sharing opinions on Nkandlagate. 
 
3.5. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, Benkler‟s networked public suits this research well, because Facebook as a public 
sphere in South Africa shows a shift from a mass-media public sphere controlled by a small 
number of commercial markets to a forum that is accessible to and generated by individuals who 
are educated and well-to-do, increasing freedom. These individuals enjoy participating in 
creating information and knowledge on Nkandlagate. The South African publics with access to 
internet have made use of the Facebook networked public sphere to communicate their 
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observations and viewpoints on Nkandla to many others without any hindrances. On Facebook, 
the South African publics have freedom of speech of a politically-critical nature, as can be seen 
through their discussions on Nkandlagate.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 
This study takes the form of qualitative research design. Qualitative research, also referred to as 
interpretivism, is a broad research method approach to the study of social action (Babbie & 
Mouton: 2001). Hence, qualitative research is also referred to as research that is interpretative 
and that constructs qualitative aspects of communication experiences (Du Plooy, 2009: 30). The 
qualitative research method differs from quantitative research in terms of its approach to the 
setting, aims of the research, research strategy and notion of objectivity.   
This method was chosen because the aim of this research is to study human beings from the 
perspective of social actors. In this research, the researcher was interested in studying human 
beings from the  perspective of social actors with the primary goal of understanding rather than 
explaining human behaviour (Babbie & Mouton: 2001). The qualitative tradition in media 
„explores the ways that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these 
understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals‟ (Deacon et 
al., 2007: 5).  
Using the qualitative method, the researcher was able to study events as they occurred and was 
able to understand why and how members of the South African publics were engaging 
themselves in the manner they did on posts made by politicians on Facebook pages about the 
Nkandlagate, rather than just reconstructing the events (Babbie & Mouton: 2001). Qualitative 
research is especially appropriate to the study of those attitudes and behaviours best understood 
within their natural setting, as opposed to the somewhat artificial settings of experiments and 
surveys. The method implies taking an insider approach to participation in the life and culture of 
respondent and researcher in the joint construction of subjective data (Henn et al., 2005).   
Qualitative research enables one to acquire in-depth information pertaining to a topic under 
investigation, especially in inductive reasoning (Du Plooy, 2009: 33). Qualitative research also 
assisted the researcher in ascertaining consistency and determining popular belief about 
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Facebook being a public sphere which has, to some extent, contributed to democracy through 
freedom of speech (ibid: 22). Qualitative research uses the strategy of analytic inductive method 
in which theory is generated from the data and its explanation is achieved through the description 
of social meanings which are interpretive (Henn et al., 2005).  
The main focus of this research was to understand social actions in terms of specific context, 
rather than attempt to generalise to the universal; an approach commonly used in quantitative 
research (ibid). Using qualitative research methodology, this research has been able to provide 
thick, rich and detailed descriptions of specific events regarding Nkandlagate discussions that 
were taking place on Facebook. This research was accomplished using critical discourse analysis 
by exploring qualitative aspects of the kinds of Nkandlagate discursive statements made on 
Facebook.  
 
4.2. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 
This research is concerned with a specific issue: Nkandlagate. Therefore, purposive sampling, 
also known as selective or judgmental sampling, has been used based on the Facebook 
discussions on Nkandlagate in 2015. Purposeful sampling is used when a researcher needs to 
identify and select information cases related to the phenomenon of interest (Tongco, 2007). 
Purposefully, two Facebook pages were selected: those of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 
and the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is the ruling party to which the President, 
who is accused as the major beneficiary of Nkandlagate, belongs; and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters is one of the most influential opposition parties in South Africa, which has been at the 
forefront in fighting President Jacob Zuma and his administration around corruption, particularly 
surrounding the Nkandlagate. The EFF also facilitated demonstrations countrywide against the 
Zuma administration to indicate their‟ dissatisfaction over the decision that Zuma was not going 
to pay back the money spent on his Nkandla residence renovations.  
Three posts were selected from each Facebook page, based on their validity on the topic in 
question and their popularity which was judged by how many people liked, shared and 
commented on the posts. From each post, 10 comments were selected for analysis. Their 
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selection was also based on their popularity, depending on how many people liked these 
comments. Specific extracts from the 10 comments were used for the analysis based on their 
different descriptive interpretations. Age group was not considered in this research, as it is 
difficult to determine age for each Facebook user, although the age group within which the most 
users in South Africa reside starts from 13, according to the study on gender balance by 
Fuseware and World Wide Worx (2015). Gender and race were also not considered in this 
research, as this research‟s focus is on the South African publics in general, provided they were 
Facebook users and were able to comment on the posts in question. Given South Africa‟s 
political economy, these attributes are crucial in determining who is being studied and thus also 
their social and economic positionality which, in turn, fundamentally shaped ideological and 
discursive „location‟.  
It should be noted that this research is not fully representative of all members of the South 
African publics; it is just aimed at giving a snapshot on how Facebook could be used in 
controversial issues affecting publics. It is also worth noting that this research concentrated on 
what the two political parties were only posting on Facebook, and not in other modes of their 
communication. Facebook has been chosen for its flexibility in extracting data and for the fact 
that it is the top social media platform currently used by most South Africans as stated by the 
Facebook First Quarter 2015 report and the We are Social (2015) report. In addition, Facebook, 
as part of social media, has enabled people to express their views freely without stiff restrictions 
as would have been the case with traditional media that can be restricted by government control 
of content.  
 
4.3. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
This research made use of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodological approach.  
CDA offers a theoretical framework for the study of social issues through analysis of discourse. 
‘Discourse‟ is a popular term that is used in a variety of ways and in various contexts, one of 
which is social studies (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). The methodology was chosen owing to 
social media – the main source of data in this research – being a discursive system. Discursive 
systems encompass multiple views, also known as universes of discourse that manifest in 
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communicative acts inside social media, within which actors negotiate shared meanings through 
dialogue and interpretation (Strauss et al., 1964). Social media is structured in such a way that it 
allows for dialogue or conversation between the writers and the readers, which is not the case 
with traditional media or even websites, since the one who updates the sites may not interact 
with those who read items on the website (Dickey & Lewis, 2010: 140). It is through these 
dialogic exchanges that discourse actions such as relationship building, social situation 
development and power imbalances can potentially affect or be catalysts to social issues.   
Social movements are examples of social issues influenced or initiated by the discourse within 
and/or the structure of social media with a goal to empower the weak. This empowerment to 
textual discourse has been enabled by social media among its participants, with the most recent 
and recognised one being the Egyptian revolution. By engaging in discourse through text on 
Facebook, people were able to organise protests to the extent of shaking the government until it 
„shut down the Internet and cell phone networks across the country‟ (Nelson, 2012: 21). The case 
of the South African Nkandlagate demonstrations which took place in August 2015, as described 
earlier in this research, is another example of social movements. The South African publics, 
through contentious performances, displays and campaigns, made collective claims on the ANC 
that Zuma must pay back the money spent in the renovations of his Nkandla residence.  Social 
media, in this case Facebook, became one of the tools used by those who had access to maintain 
sustained challenges against Zuma. When this research was being completed, Zuma was ordered 
by the South African Constitutional Court to pay back the money. Thus, as Frederick Taylor 
(1856-1915) states, words by their descriptions can form reality.  
There are several approaches to CDA, including Michel Foucault‟s (1970) approach, Jürgen 
Habermas‟s (1984) approach and Norman Fairclough‟s (1989) approach. However, due to its 
flexibility as a CDA approach, this research uses Fairclough‟s approach in providing multiple 
points of analytic entry. The most important thing about Fairclough‟s approach is that it enables 
one to focus on the signifiers that make up the text, the specific linguistic selections, their 
juxtapositioning, their sequencing and their layout.  
Fairclough‟s (1989) work in the early to mid-1990s was focused on describing a method for 
analysing discourse. Initially, Fairclough (1989; 1992a; 1995c) identified his approach to a 
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„critical language study‟, a study of language in which he reviewed a range of mainstream 
approaches,  including linguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, cognitive psychology, artificial  
intelligence, conversation analysis and discourse analysis.  His argument was that although all of 
these areas had something to offer language study, they also displayed limitations for a critical 
perspective (Fairclough, 1989; 1995c). He pointed out criticisms such as positivist aspects of 
sociolinguistics, the individualism promoted in pragmatics and disregarding context in 
conversation analysis. In his attempt to address these shortfalls, he cited his approach as an 
alternative orientation as opposed to just another method of studying language discourse 
(Fairclough, 1989: 10), which he named a social theory of discourse (Fairclough, 1992a: 92).  
This was aimed at bringing together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and 
political thought relevant to discourse and language. According to Fairclough (1989), a close 
analysis of language contributed to understandings about power relations and ideology in 
discourse.  
However, during the early 1990s, Fairclough (1992a: 1) developed a „method of language 
analysis‟ which is both theoretically adequate and practically usable.  Fairclough‟s work offers 
methodological advice for undertaking CDA, although he termed it a guide and not a blueprint, 
and claimed it to be prescriptive (Fairclough, 1989: 110). Fairclough‟s (1989; 1995) model for 
CDA comprises three inter-related processes of analysis tied to three inter-related dimensions of 
discourse which have been presented by Hilary Janks (1996) in her  article Critical Discourse 
Analysis as a Research Tool. These processes are: 
1) The object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts);    
2) The processes by means of which the object is produced and received (writing/ 
speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects;  
3) The socio-historical conditions which govern these processes.  
 
Each of these dimensions, according to Fairclough, requires a different kind of analysis: 
1) Text analysis (description); 
2)  Processing analysis (interpretation); 
3)  Social analysis (explanation). 
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It does not matter which kind of analysis one begins with, as long as in the end they are all 
included and are shown to be mutually explanatory. It is in the interconnections that the analyst 
finds the interesting patterns and disjunctions that need to be described, interpreted and 
explained. 
Therefore, CDA is the most appropriate method to analyse the discussions about Nkandlagate 
that were taking place on Facebook political party pages.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. ANALYSING THE TEXTS 
This research uses unedited text of the posts and comments on Facebook. One posting is 
analysed for the sake of brevity.  In the context of this study, the research uses four discursive 
genre types: 1) Corporate discursive genre (discourses that imply mutual agreement); 2) 
Pragmatism discursive (discourses indicating practical considerations); 3) Adversary discursive 
(these refer to disagreeing views) and 4) detachment discursive (which refer to neutral discursive 
genres).  
 
POST ONE 
The first three posts to be analysed will be those of the EFF
62
 Facebook pages. 
The first post was posted on 6 July and attracted 141 Likes, 50 Comments and 24 Shares.  
EXTRACTS FROM THE POST:  
EFF STATEMENT ON CONTINUING PATHOLOGICAL LIES BY NATHI NHLEKO IN 
DEFENCE OF NKANDLA CORRUPTION 
[The Minister has lied about cattle kraals and chicken runs being ‘security features’. He 
has lied about the total cost of security features in Nkandla being less than they actually 
are. He has lied about the Public Protector not finding that government built any houses 
for President Zuma and his family. He has lied about not knowing why and who approved 
the construction of the village consisting of 21 three-bedroomed houses at the Nkandla 
compound at an over-inflated cost of R6.5 million each. The Minister has committed his 
office and the police ministry to pathological lies and the defence of corruption instead of 
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upholding the rule of law and ensuring that crooks like President Zuma are brought to 
book]. 
[Nhleko in defending multimillion Rand corruption in Nkandla claimed that a so-called 
‘firepool’ was also constructed at the private residence of the former President Nelson 
Mandela in Qunu. The Mandela granddaughters have dismissed Nhleko’s utterances as 
pure lies…] 
5.1.1. Analysis 1: Post 
The descriptions derived from the first EFF post include: Deception, truthfulness and 
determination. In this case, deception means relaying information to people that is not true in a 
way that would make them believe it as true for personal gain. Truthfulness means providing 
information to justify something after some enquiries. Determination means making a firm 
decision to make sure that the problem in question is resolved.  
The EFF feels that Zuma‟s administration has been deceiving South African publics through 
their numerous lies pertaining to the Nkandla saga, including the cattle kraals and chicken runs 
being security features, total cost of security features, the Public Protector‟s findings, being 
unaware of reasons and those responsible for the approval of the Nkandla construction, as well as 
lying and defending corruption instead of protecting its culprit; namely President Zuma.  
In their statement, there is seemingly – although non-empirical – truthful information through 
their confirmation with Mandela‟s grandchildren that Nhleko‟s allegation that a firepool was also 
constructed at the private residence of the former President Nelson Mandela in Qunu was a lie. 
The EFF is determined not to rest until Zuma pays back every cent he spent on the renovation of 
Nkandla, by consistently reminding Zuma about it wherever the EFF party officials meet him. 
Minister Nhlanhla is being urged by the EFF to assist Zuma in paying back the money.  
In their speech, the EFF seem to be fighting for a better South Africa in which government 
officials should refrain from corruption and lies. #Zuma must pay back the money indicates a 
pragmatism genre type of discourse.  
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By disseminating information on Facebook about the Nkandla saga which concerns the ruling 
South African government, the EFF indicate a direct form of democracy (Maduz, 2010: 1). The 
EFF is directly and actively participating in the Nkandla political issue and making their stand 
known to the South African publics that Zuma must pay back the money. In this case, the EFF is 
engaging in participatory journalism (Bowman & Willis, 2003) which entails the use of 
information technologies to both empower individual citizens and promote democratic ideals 
through the spread of information (Exoo, 2010). There is a possibility of 'electronic democracy‟ 
(Street, 2001: 214) as demonstrated by the EFF, because Facebook is free from strong South 
African government regulations (Exoo, 2010). From their post, the EFF are also seen as a 
watchdog for the South African publics (Zhao, 1998), to some extent replacing the role of 
traditional media as in Africa traditional media are said to be failing to investigate the financial 
activities of large companies and governments (ibid).  African journalists have found it difficult 
to undertake evocative long form investigative reporting due to commercial adverts and 
government propaganda (Rodrigues & Schiffin, 2015: 124). By informing the South African 
publics on Facebook about issues surrounding Nkandlagate, including all the ongoing 
government lies pertaining to Nkandla expenditures, the EFF, from this research‟s point of view, 
is seen to be playing a watchdog role although some might look at it as playing party politics 
taking advantage of social media as a „new‟ tool. On the other hand, the EFF uses Facebook to 
disseminate information because Facebook offers a more public and democratic space that is 
easily accessible to South African publics with access to Facebook. In this case, Facebook has to 
some extent, although not fully, solved the problem of having limited political knowledge for 
ordinary South African citizens with access to Facebook, which has been hindering their capacity 
to get involved in the process of deliberation (Street, 2001: 217) as the government cannot 
control the flow information on Facebook (Benkler, 2006). 
EXTRACTS IN RESPONSE TO THE EFF POST BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLICS  
 [He must PAY BACK THE MONEY! That has benefited unduly, South Africa is suffering 
from high rate of unemployment and is also suffering to pay for young people out there to 
enfeather their studies. but Zuma, Nhleko they should brought to book.] 
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[Where ever we meet him we gonna shout pay back the money! On the street, shebeen, 
outside the country and even in the rallies of the ANC, wil shout pay back the money!] 
 
[I just saw zuma's head entering te toilet door as i was peeing,,,…’ ‘The buttocks defence 
force is running out of ammunition….Now all they have is their bums] 
[he will not pay] 
 
5.1.2. Analysis 2: Comments 
Descriptions established from the comments made to the above post include: disquiet, willpower 
and indecency. Disquiet in this case means a feeling of worry or unease. Willpower in this case 
is the same as to be determined, as discussed above. Indecency means using inappropriate words 
to explain a situation or describe someone.  
The South African publics‟ comments indicate South African publics‟ disquiet about the current 
poor status of their country with a high rate of unemployment and a poor education system.  
South African publics are demonstrating their willpower to make sure that Zuma must pay back 
the money at all costs. They are prepared to shout at him to pay back the money wherever they 
meet him, be it on the street, in shebeens or at rallies. While there is a common concern about 
Zuma‟s maladministration activities in South Africa, some of the South African publics show 
signs of indecency in their approach to try and rectify the problem; for example, statements like, 
‘I just saw zuma's head entering te toilet door as i was peeing,,,…the buttocks defence force is 
running out of ammunition….Now all they have is their bums’.  The words used in this statement, 
such as buttocks and bums, are not appropriate because they are not in line with what needs to be 
discussed pertaining to Nkandlagate. 
There are three types of discursive genres in the comments made: „cooperative‟ discourse: first, 
from their comments, most of the South African publics mutually agree that Zuma must pay back 
the money. This is also a „pragmatism‟ type of discourse. There are also some „detachment‟ 
forms of discourse in the comments which show neutrality; for example, ‘he will not pay’. In this 
case, it is not clear whether the writer supports the views of the EFF or the ANC. It is difficult to 
know the reason behind the above statement – whether „he will not pay‟ is due to Zuma‟s 
adamancy not to pay, or that he is not supposed to pay back the money. However, there is a 
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mutual agreement with the EFF post by the South African publics on Facebook that Zuma must 
pay back the money. 
With Facebook, South African publics with access to Facebook are able to participate in 
controversial political matters affecting their country. There is an indication that Facebook 
provides infrastructure for deliberation, which may eventually lead to real actions (Keane, 2000: 
67). The people who are information contributors might not be aware of journalistic values; 
hence the use of indecent words as seen in the comments. As seen in the above comments, 
Facebook is helpful in the creation of knowledgeable South African publics through public 
discussions, debates and sharing opinions on Nkandlagate. There is a public attitude or belief 
about Zuma‟s maladministration of the South African government (Bianco & Canon, 2013). The 
public opinion by the South African publics is that Zuma must pay back the money. Facebook 
also provides the South African publics with access to Facebook, a social space where they are 
able to discuss, share and develop opinions on political issues (Benkler, 2006), free from the 
government control. 
 
POST TWO 
The EFF‟s second post was made on 4 October 2015, with 350 Likes, 90 Comments and 75 
Shares. 
EXTRACTS FROM THE POST  
EFF WELCOMES THE CONCOURT DECISION TO HAVE PUBLIC PROTECTOR JOIN THE 
PAY BACK THE MONEY CASE 
[The EFF welcomes the Constitutional Court decision to have the Public Protector join in 
on the EFF case to have Zuma   Pay ackTheMoney . This decision is significant…] 
[The EFF's prayer to the constitutional court is simple. The prayer is that Zuma must be 
ordered to #PayBackTheMoney improperly used in the upgrade of his home in Nkandla. 
This case will restore the dignity and respectability to the office of the Public Protector] 
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[Zuma has done everything in his power to avoid paying back the money. This includes 
using ministers like Nhleko to fabricate a path out of the responsibility to pay] 
[and many who sought to raise it in parliament and allowed his ministers to also attack all 
who raise it, including the office of the Public Protector] 
[The judges ask direct question and seek direct answers; when they say when you are 
paying back the money, they do not expect you to say who must pay it. They say this 
because they would have already concluded that person they ask the question, must pay] 
[The EFF calls on all South Africans to also throw their support in this historic fight 
against a corrupt president who has no regard for public resources] 
[The struggle against the abuse of state resources and corruption by politicians, their 
families and friends will indeed be advanced by a thousand steps] 
5.1.3. Analysis 3: Post 
The main descriptions identified in the second post include: Satisfaction, patriotism, obstinacy, 
honesty, humor, persuasion and determination. Satisfaction here means having a fulfillment on 
one‟s wishes or expectations and the pleasure derived from this. Patriotism in this case means 
demonstrating vigorous support for one's country. Obstinacy means being stubborn not wanting 
to listen to other people‟s views. Honesty means truthfulness. Humor means something amusing. 
Persuasion means to induce someone to do something through reasoning or argument. 
The EFF is satisfied by the Constitutional Court‟s decision to have the Public Protector join in 
the EFF case in attempting to make Zuma pay back the money. In their determination to have 
Zuma pay back the money, the EFF have gone to the extent of using prayers for the 
Constitutional Court to order Zuma to pay back the money. It is the EFF‟s wish to have a South 
Africa in which the public Protector‟s Office is respected by the government and able to operate 
independently; this could be achieved by the Constitutional Court ordering Zuma to pay back the 
money.  
In their communication, the EFF indicated that Zuma is a stubborn president, as he is trying 
everything not to respond to the people‟s outcry to pay back the money, including fabrication of 
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stories surrounding the Nkandla issue by using ministers like Nhleko and also attacking those 
who raise the issue in parliament, not sparing the Public Protector‟s office. With the above 
justifications on the said strategies used by Zuma in order not to pay back the money, the EFF 
seem to be providing truthful information to the South African publics.   
In their post, the EFF somehow takes a humorous approach; for example, by saying: „The judges 
ask direct question and seek direct answers; when they say when you are paying back the money, 
they do not expect you to say who must pay it. They say this because they would have already 
concluded that person they ask the question, must pay’.  
The EFF speech is seemingly persuading South African publics to unite in the fight against 
Zuma they are calling for all South Africans to unite in the fight against corruption. To show 
their determination that they will not give up on Zuma, further steps will be take until he pays 
that money back. The EFF is basically requesting the Constitution Court to give orders to Zuma 
to #PayBackTheMoney which was improperly used in the upgrade of his home in Nkandla. The 
pragmatism discourse part of this post, as addressed by the EFF, is that Zuma must pay back the 
money, as he would be instructed to do so by the court. The EFF is again playing its watchdog 
role (Zhao, 1998) to make sure that the South African government operates in accordance with 
the Constitution. There should be no corruption amongst government officials and the misused 
public funds must be paid back. According to the South African Constitution, the Public 
Protector's office should operate in favour of the needs of the South African publics by exposing 
all corruption by the government.  
As the opposition parties like the EFF are able to air their views about Nkandlagate on Facebook 
and share them to the South African publics, it indicates freedom of expression that the 
networked public sphere has brought to the South African publics in order to participate in 
political matters without necessarily being threatened by the government (Street, 2001; Benkler, 
2006). This is different from other vehicles such as traditional media, as these are mostly used by 
governments of countries to maintain a monopoly on public conversations. 
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EXTRACTS IN RESPONSE TO THE EFF’s SECOND POST BY THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN PUBLICS  
[I respect our judicial system, it was very clear to everyone that public protector's office 
was under attack because of the findings she and her office made against mr Zuma on the 
nkanda scandal, they tried all things under the sun to weaken that office, big up to the 
public protector and her team for not succumbing to the ANC and their tricks] 
[We are the only party who speak the truth]. 
[The majority in parliament, point of orders, bouncers, presiding officers etc. cannot 
protect him this time....] 
[Keep up the good work guys to hold executive to account….] [I smell victory in the 
forthcoming case of the pay back money as per PP report in Concourt in February next 
year…] 
[JZmustfall…] 
[…..I must tell you straight that you guys are champions. You are doing more than 
excellent job. Big up to you guys] 
[…all this is done by the very same ruling party who sings transparency...mxm!!!pay back 
the money....] 
5.1.4. Analysis 4: Comments 
This research identified these descriptions from the above comments: Contentment, optimism 
and grit. Contentment means expressing happiness and satisfaction. Optimism here means being 
hopeful and confident about the future. Grit means showing courage or determination.  
South African publics indicate a sense of contentment with regard to their country‟s judicial 
system. They are pleased with the judicial system for their judgment towards the Public 
Protector, as they are aware how her office has been under attack by the ANC after its findings 
against Zuma and are in support of Madonsela for her stand against Zuma‟s corruption activities. 
Meanwhile, some EFF members proudly feel that they are the only truthful party. South African 
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publics on Facebook are full of expectations that in court Zuma would have to appear alone 
where there would be no ANC officials and bouncers to defend him; he would then be in a better 
position to explain himself to the general public regarding Nkandlagate. Some of them are very 
optimistic about victory coming their way in February, following their outcry over Zuma and 
Nkandlagate. Others really want Zuma out of the way. They are looking forward to Zuma‟s 
downfall. Some South Africa publics are expressing disappointment, as it is ironic to see that this 
is happening to a party that preaches transparency. Through the diversity of views offered on 
these comments by various South Africans, there is the universal determination that Zuma must 
pay back the money. 
The two identified discursive genres in these comments are: cooperative discourse – most South 
African publics are not amused about the corruption taking place in the ANC, particularly on the 
expenditure of taxpayers‟ money for the renovation of Nkandla residence – and pragmatism 
discourse – their opinion is that Zuma must face the court and pay back their money. With the 
freedom of participation on Facebook, it is very difficult for the ANC as a ruling government to 
clarify themselves and convince South Africans that they are not in the wrong, especially having 
the opposition EFF party there as watchdogs, disseminating information to have their part heard 
to justify how poorly the ANC is conducting itself as a ruling party. This is where democracy in 
the networked public sphere benefits citizens. Information filtration is exclusively in their hands 
and they can use their subjective judgment to know who is speaking the truth and who is not and 
make informed decisions. Using Benkler‟s argument, it would seem that the ANC are finding it 
difficult to control information flow from their opponents on Facebook, a characteristic that 
makes networked public sphere a true alternative public sphere in a democratic world. 
 
POST THREE 
This post was written on 13 October, attracting 171 Likes, 54 Comments and 46 Shares. 
EXTRACTS FROM THE POST: 
EFF STATEMENT ON ACCUSATIONS THAT PUBLIC PROTECTOR IS PARTIAL IN 
JOINING PAY BACK THE MONEY CASE 
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[The EFF condemns the  N 's lazy logic that the Public Protector's decision to join the 
  Pay ackTheMoney case means that she is not impartial… The Public Protector has not 
joined the EFF, her office is not taking a membership of the EFF. The Public Protector is 
joining a court case, a legal matter that finds its genesis from her report, investigation and 
remedial action] 
[We call upon South Africans to also join in by supporting this case, because it is the case 
seeking to recover the money belonging to the people] 
[There is no point of order, parliamentary ad hoc committee or bouncers who can stop 
Zuma from facing the truth that he must with speed, pay back the money that was unduly 
spent in his private home in Nkandla] 
5.1.5. Analysis 5: Post 
The descriptions identified in this research for the above posts are: Truthfulness, persuasion, 
determination and patriotism. 
The EFF states that, although the Public Protector joined the EFF court case against 
Nkandlagate, this does not make her a member of the EFF. This is seen in their statement. The 
EFF is persuading all South Africans to join in the fight of Nkandlagate by telling them that the 
spent money that needs to be recovered belongs to them. The EFF is determined that Zuma will 
have to face the truth without anyone or anything to protect him. The EFF is of the opinion that 
Zuma must pay back the money immediately.  
The pragmatism discourse in this post is that Zuma must pay back the money. The EFF is using 
Facebook strategies to express their opinions; hence, ideally exerting influence in relation to the 
South African political and economic management over Nkandlagate.  This is part of direct 
democracy (Maduz, 2010: 1). Although  traditional media has always kept track of the 
government's corruption charges, here the EFF is seen to continue persuading the government to 
pay back the money and are informing the South African publics on the Nkandlagate updates.  
As watchdogs, the EFF is telling the Zuma administration that they are alert to whatever the 
government is doing that might divert the EFF demands that Zuma should pay back the money. 
With this post on the EFF Facebook page, most South African publics are aware that they can all 
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join in the fight against corruption without fear, more than ever before. This is in tandem with 
Benkler‟s theory of the networked public sphere. 
PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE ON THE EFF’s THIRD POST BY THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN PUBLICS  
[We need that money he must pay it back we knw that the ANC will defend him coz they 
knw if the president is going down they also going down] 
[we are aware of their tricks and we are focused on the issue not the side issues which the 
Anc wish to achieve.......we are now familiar with their tactics and is no longer holding 
water any more] 
[Come 09 February, Zuma will be appearing in the court of law over his scandal for the 
first time since he became the State President] 
[this problem is not for EFF they must stop thinking like animals this matter is for all south 
Africa. He also said he is going to fight corruption (NGC) he must lead by example] 
[Remind me again why i ever voted for the ANC] 
 [Zuma must pay back the money] 
5.1.6. Analysis 6: Comments 
This research identified the following descriptions from the above comments: Sagaciousness, 
sanguinity, devotion, remorseful and fortitude. Sagaciousness in this case means judging the 
situation to make a good decision. Sanguinity means optimism. Devotion means patriotism. 
Remorseful means to feel sorry or regretting. Fortitude is same as determination. 
The South African publics are wise to note that Zuma‟s followers are protecting him – they are 
aware of the consequences once Zuma leaves, as they would have to follow suit. Nevertheless, 
the money needs to be paid back. South African publics are also saying that they are more 
knowledgeable about all the ANC tricks to try and fool them and that they are wise enough not to 
fall for such tricks. There is an indication of hope and confidence amongst South African publics 
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that on 9 February, Zuma will definitely appear before the law over Nkandlagate for the first 
time since he became the State President.  
South African publics on Facebook are very concerned about what goes on in their country; to 
them the Nkandla problem is not an EFF problem as the ANC is stating, but it is a common 
concern amongst South African publics. Besides, Zuma promised South African publics that he 
would fight corruption and he must stick to his word. Others are even regretting that they voted 
for the ANC in the first place. There is still a determination by South African publics that Zuma 
must pay back their money. This shows a pragmatism type of discourse. Most of the South 
African publics are against the conduct of Zuma's administration and are in support of the EFF's 
steps to take Zuma to court in order for him to pay back the money, an indication of a 
cooperative form of discourse.  
The Internet facilitates democratic discourse and civic culture to a wider range of citizens 
(Dahlgren, 2005). A diverse range of information providers is essential for a democratic society 
to enable viewers, readers and listeners to receive a broad spectrum of information that is not 
tightly controlled, biased and filtered (Golding & Murdock, 2000). In this regard, most South 
African publics on Facebook are able to give their views about how they feel about the ongoing 
Nkandla saga and most of them are able to learn more from what others are saying on 
Nkandlagate. In this regard, South African publics with access to Facebook are aware of exactly 
what is going on in their country through sharing different views on Facebook. 
 
PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE ON THE ANC FACEBOOK PAGE
63
  
POST ONE 
The post was made on 6 August 2015, attracting 227 Likes, 102, Comments and 31 Shares. 
 
 
                                                          
63
ANC Facebook page (2015). [Online]. Available: 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1042356492455861&id=277018335656351 [02/12/2015]. 
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EXTRACTS FROM THE POST: 
FINALISATION AND ADOPTION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT 
[The police minister’s report, in particular, gives a thorough and accurate picture of the 
state of affairs regarding the upgrades at Nkandla and was helpful during the course of the 
committee’s in loco inspection.  ontrary to the opposition political posturing, the report of 
the police minister was never intended as a replacement for any other investigative report 
on Nkandla] 
[The ad hoc committee found in its report that South Africans were misled about the so-
called opulence at the private residence of the President and that there was a gross 
exaggeration of the scope, scale and cost of the project] 
 [The EFF's decision to take the matter relating to the Nkandla security upgrades to the 
 onstitutional  ourt is a right that any person or party enjoys under our constitution…We 
are hopeful that contesting the matter in Court would do them good, as Courts make 
judgment on the basis of facts, evidence and cogent legal arguments] 
[The minority report of the opposition does not only undermine the thorough work that the 
committee had undertaken, it also undermines the contribution they made during the 
process. The report, for instance, contradicts the frank contributions they made following 
the inspection visit at the private residence of the President]. 
[those responsible for deviation from the PFMA should be held accountable and the money 
must be recovered from those found guilty of these transgressions] 
[Measures must be taken by government to ensure that this does not repeat itself as it 
makes mockery of public prescripts when regulations are by-passed with almost impunity. 
We call on swift action to ensure full accountability by those implicated]. 
5.1.7. Analysis 7: Post 
The descriptions that were identified on this post are: Persuasion, defensive and blame-shifting. 
Defensive as used in this research means to be very anxious to challenge or avoid criticism. 
Blame-shifting means a tactic to push fault on another person other than oneself. 
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The ANC sounds convincing when explaining that the police minister‟s report gives a thorough 
and accurate picture of the Nkandla expenditure and that the report was not meant to replace any 
other investigations as stipulated by opposition political party, but rather to provide a full 
account of the implementation of the recommendations of the previous ad hoc committee. In 
their persuasive speech, the ANC are trying to convince South African publics that the ad hoc 
committee feels that South Africans were misled about the every detail of the Nkandlagate, 
including the involved funds, scope and scales. In addition, the ANC are saying that the ANC 
South African publics should not rely on the findings of the minority report as it not accurate and 
undermines the ad hoc contributions. In their speech, the ANC defended themselves by seeming 
to agree with the EFF decision to take the Nkandla case to the Constitutional Court, as it is in 
line with the South African Constitution which is supposed to be enjoyed by all South Africans. 
They go on to convince the South African general public that they are aware that courts make 
judgments on the basis of facts, evidence and cogent legal arguments. It is also seen in their 
speech that the ANC is shifting the blame to other people other than Zuma himself; for example, 
the blame goes to those that are said to be „responsible for deviation from the PFMA’.  
In their post, the ANC are persuading South African publics by using pragmatism discourses, as 
in the above statement, and trying to change their minds and convince them that the ANC are a 
responsible government and that Zuma is not in the wrong – as is being portrayed by the 
opposition parties. Other pragmatism discourses used in their post include calling for measures 
by the government to ensure that the situation regarding corruption does not repeat itself.   
The ANC‟s defensive mechanism using Facebook is aimed at convincing the South African 
publics and to divert them from the negative perception they have towards them as a corrupt 
government. The ANC does not want to lose their voters. 
COMMENTS BY THE PUBLICS TO THE ANC POST 
[The next election am not gona vote for ANC ....] 
[We might be poor but we are not stupid...... Stop insulting our intelligence…] 
[…what a corrupt  N ..  orrupt and selfish  rooks only!!!!...] 
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[In your foolish statement, you are trying by all means not to mention the #PublicProtector 
Report. How was the general public misled and who misled it? On what basis are you 
nullifying the recommendations of the Public Protector?] 
[A demon was formed in a form of public protector to destroy our loved ANC and 
President…] 
[In the event that the ad Hoc committee sugests that President Zuma is supposed to pay 
back some of the money, we are prepared to pay R2,50 each bearing in mind that we are 
over a million and some unaudited supporters] 
[Viva President Zuma viva…no weapon formed against  N  shall prosper That Zuma 
should not pay back the money, and ‘EFF must go to Hell! They lack law knowledge…] 
 [Thuli Madonsela is an ANC loyal cadre] 
[Even the most benevolent of governments are made up of people with all the propensities 
for human failings. The rule of law as we understand it consists in the set of conventions 
and arrangements that ensure that it is not left to the whims of individual rulers to decide 
on what is good for the populace. The administrative conduct of government and 
authorities are subject to scrutiny of independent organs. This is an essential element of 
good governance that we have sought to have built into our new constitutional order] 
5.1.8 Analysis 8: Comments 
This research identified these descriptions for the above comments: Sagaciousness, arrogance, 
loyalty, indecency and detachment. Arrogance in this research means having an exaggerated 
sense of one's own importance or abilities. Loyalty means being supportive and being proud of a 
feeling of belonging. Detachment means being neutral, failing to clearly show which side of the 
argument one is. 
Some of the South African publics on Facebook have lost hope in the ANC and are promising to 
be wiser in the next general elections and not to vote for the party. Some of them are trying to 
make the ANC see sense by saying that although they may be poor, the party should not think 
they are fools and have their intelligence insulted. To some South African publics, the ANC is 
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full of corrupt, selfish and crooked people and therefore the party cannot be trusted.  Some South 
Africa publics feel that the ANC are fools in their reasoning; for example, by questioning 
whether the ANC were misled by the Public Protector‟s reporter. While some South African 
publics on Facebook look at Madonsela as a Good Samaritan to their problem, others, especially 
ANC members, describe her as „a demon‟, an evil woman who is there to destroy President 
Zuma and his ANC. Some ANC members are being arrogant and feel that being part of the 
majority, they can volunteer to pay the money which was spent on the Nkandla residence. They 
can square the debts by just having each member contribute R2.50. However, this is a wrong 
opinion as not all ANC members would be willing to contribute a cent to save Zuma from his 
corruption charges. Therefore, this view is not practical.  
There is also an indication of party and personal loyalty from the South African publics who are 
seemingly ANC supporters; they are calling for the EFF to go to hell with their lack of 
knowledge on laws and saying that whatever plans the EFF and others are planning against 
Zuma shall fail. They are implying that Zuma will not have to pay back the money – corrupt or 
not, Zuma remains their President.  
While most of the comments made enable one to figure out on which side the writer belongs, the 
writer‟s preference is difficult to determine in some comments; for example: „Thuli Madonsela is 
an  N  loyal cadre’. In this case, it is difficult to say whether the writer is on the side of the EFF 
or the ANC. Another example is a comment about Nelson Mandela. The two comments are 
therefore detachment discursive. In their comments on this post, the majority of South African 
publics on Facebook show negative views about the ANC post. They still believe that the ANC 
is an irresponsible government full of lies. This is an adversary type of discourse.  
There is evidence of participatory democracy as seen in the discussion. Everyone in South Africa 
with access to Facebook has an opportunity to contribute meaningfully (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004) their true opinion over Nkandlagate, either from the ANC side, the EFF side or even 
neutrally. Facebook has indeed provided an alternative space for political discourse between 
South African publics' communication and interaction between politicians and the public 
(Salanova, 2012; Benkler, 2006). The traditional one-way communication of what mass media 
believes needs to be set on public agenda has been downplayed by the higher degree of freedom 
provided by social media in news selection. In this case, if it was not for Facebook, the ANC 
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could have used any traditional media, giving very limited chance for public‟s contributions. 
However, as seen in the discussions, opposition members are able to comment without fear 
which is an indication of participatory democracy made possible by networked public sphere. 
 
POST TWO 
The post was written on 19 August, with 242 Likes, 106 Comments and 37 Shares. 
EXTRACTS FROM THE POST: 
ANC STATEMENT ON THE ADHOC COMMITTE ON NKANDLA REPORT 
[The African National Congress welcomes the conclusion of the work of the Adhoc 
Committee on Nkandla report which has diligently and thoroughly carried its task to 
conclusion. We also welcome the findings and recommendations regarding the reckless 
and rampant corruption by government officials and contractors] 
[It is our view that this matter must be given urgent attention to ensure that those 
responsible for this corruption should be held accountable for their wrong doing. We call 
law enforcement agencies and affected departments to act decisively] 
[Measures must be taken by government to ensure that this does not repeat itself as it 
makes mockery of public prescripts when regulations are by-passed with almost impunity. 
We call on swift action to ensure full accountability by those implicated] 
5.1.9. Analysis 9: Post 
Descriptions that were identified in this post are: Coaxing and blame-shifting. Coaxing means 
persuasion. 
The ANC is trying to convince the South African public that the ad hoc committee on Nkandla 
report diligently and thoroughly carried out its task to conclusion, with which it is satisfied. It 
goes further to suggest that the ANC is equally against corruption and that the law should be 
exercised to bring to book all those involved in corruption to avoid repetition.  It should be noted 
in ANC speeches that Zuma is being excluded from being a culprit. The ANC seems to be 
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shifting blame to government officials and contractors, rather than to Zuma himself. A number of 
pragmatic discourses have also been used in their speeches, including comments that the 
Nkandla matter should be given urgent attention, those responsible for the corruption should be 
dealt with accordingly and the law enforcement agencies and affected departments should act 
decisively. Here again, Facebook is being used by the ANC for defensive purposes in order for 
them to be cleared from the Nkandla corruption charges. The aim is not to lose voters. 
COMMENTS BY THE PUBLICS TO THE ANC POST 
[…we have been subjected to humiliation from this person and we on the ground are 
suffering as we have to answer to this gemorse of Nkandla. Please comrades. ...lets stop 
this and resort the ANC values that liberated this country] 
[…the people who truly love the  N  are deeply hurt by the damage done by Zuma's 
lapdogs who are hellbent on covering up his corrupt activities] 
[Well done ANC, you have successfully destroyed the democracy of South Africa which 
was written in the blood of those who fought hard for many decades and died for it.... Well 
done!!!] 
[They ANC says they support the report of police minister Nathi Nhleko and its 
recommendations, it also says swift actions must be taken against all those who are 
involved in the Nkandla saga. The same ANC rejects the Public Protectors report the 
report that is clear and its recommendations, and endoses the report of a Cabinet Minister 
undermining the report of a chapter 9 institution. The ANC contradicts itself in this matter.  
think voter must be sobber in their mind when they are voting] 
 
[LOL... The ANC is a joke. No intergrity whatsoever. Just dugging this great organization 
deeper and deeper into a hole. Losing more and more support. Why don't you just get rid 
of all the rotten apples and try and restore your credibilty with the people which you are 
ripping off] 
[We call on swift action to ensure full accountability by those implicated.’ Why does this 
exclude Zuma who was implicated by Madonsela] 
[We must protect our President against Draculars] 
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5.1.10. Analysis 10: Comments 
 
In the above comments, the identified descriptions are: Patriotism, sagaciousness and loyalty. 
 
There is an indication that while some of the South African publics on Facebook might love the 
party, they are not happy with Zuma‟s corruption stories. Zuma‟s corruption activities have 
subjected all ANC supporters to humiliation and are calling for the rest of the ANC members to 
rectify the problem in order to restore the once respected ANC. The ANC has done a lot of 
damage to the party‟s reputation and it is so painful to some ANC supporters to see how some 
party officials are shielding Zuma. Some South African publics are crying „foul‟, seeing how 
Zuma has destroyed the South African democracy that has cost many South Africans‟ lives. The 
ANC reasoning capacity is questionable to some of the South African publics. They see the party 
contradicting itself in its speeches and in the next elections they will be wiser about whom to 
vote for. Some South African publics wonder how some ANC officials are allowing one person 
to destroy the reputation of such a big and good party. They therefore lack integrity, because they 
could have just removed Zuma and all who are involved in corruption activities in the ANC 
(rotten apples) in order for the party to regain its credibility. Some South African publics are 
questioning why Zuma should be immune to Madonsela‟s report. Others still show loyalty to 
President Zuma and feel that Zuma should be protected from being attacked.  
There are cooperative and adversary discourses in these comments. Cooperative discourse is 
where most of the South African publics, whether EFF, ANC or just ordinary citizens do not 
condone corruption activities by the Zuma‟s administration. The adversary discourse is that 
South African publics show disagreement with the ANC views in this post.  
South African publics have proven their democratic rights in their discussions on Facebook 
pertaining Nkandlagate through the networked public sphere.  As seen in the discussions, on the 
ANC page, Facebook has to a large extent indicated the potential to challenge sovereign power. 
Facebook has provided South African publics a public sphere from which they have a chance to 
interpret whatever message is sent across to them. Facebook has brought about direct democracy 
in which South African publics are able to contest the ruling party‟s regime even on their page 
without any fear and hindrances. 
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POST THREE 
This post was made on 19 August 2015, attracting 284 Likes, 140 Comments and 35 Shares. 
BELOW ARE THE EXTRACTS FROM THE POST: 
THE D ’S DE ISION TO  PPRO  H THE  OURT ON NK NDL  M TTER 
[We know too well that Courts and police stations have now become fashionable places for 
media theatrics, where opposition parties attract a certain degree of media attention on the 
door steps of the Courts and police stations than they would in their offices] 
[…our focus as the Majority Party in this institution is now on ensuring that important 
recommendations passed by Parliament yesterday are implemented by the executive] 
 
5.1.11. Analysis 11: Post 
 
The descriptions that are identified in this post are: Inducement and egoism. Inducement means 
persuasion. Egoism means an excessive or exaggerated sense of self-importance. 
 
The ANC is trying to convince South African publics that the opposition parties seek nothing but 
media fame in their approach to resolving the Nkandla saga through courts and police stations. 
The ANC is displaying selfish characteristics (egoism) in their speech; as long as they are in the 
majority as a party, they don‟t care about the concerns of the EFF or the DA on the Nkandla 
issue. What is important to them is to make sure that whatever was discussed in parliament on 
Nkandlagate is implemented by the executive. Their speech indicates pragmatic discourse; 
namely, they will practically implement all the recommendations that were passed by parliament.  
Usman (2015) states that Facebook could sometimes be misused by the politicians; the 
advantage of a network public sphere which could also be regarded as a challenge is that 
depending on the levels of control of Facebook pages, everyone with access to Facebook could 
post anything they wish, regardless of who is going to be happy about it, or not. As can be seen 
in their post, it is clear that the ANC takes advantage of their majority party status to act however 
they please, regardless of what opposition parties think or do. 
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COMMENTS BY THE PUBLICS TO THE ABOVE ANC POST 
[It is not a matter of who's more trustworthy than the other but of facts. Money was 
misused, corruption occured and possibly money laundering too… Now that we all know 
and AGREE that money was misused and Inflated in the Security upgrades in Nkandla, 
shouldn't we be focusing on finding those who committed this crime using President 
Zuma's private residence to enrich themselves and subject them to the rule of law] 
[Is the substitution of the report of the public protector legitimate and constitutional? We 
won't be fooled by ANC majority in parliament] 
[Have ya noticed in Parliament yesterday after the report was adopted that all the majority 
party's benches were empty…. and then ya write this article telling us that the opposition 
failed to persuade Parliament, are ya in ya right mind? Because the whole process was 
done and concluded in Luthuli House others are straying along the games played by ANC, 
the formation of those committees, decisions, adoption and voting for those reports were 
designed by Luthuli House, so WHO ARE YOU FOOLING ANC???!!!!] 
[ANC has became a disgrace under Zuma's leadership, I will never vote for this party 
again] 
[Every year ppl threatning the ANC that they will not vote for ANC but the ANC win & 
next comming elections the ANC is going to win again] 
[I am dissapointed by ANC on the Nkandla issue, we love our movement but how leaders 
protect corruption hurt us] 
[All I have seen is the over reliance to Thuli Madonsela's report to the three reports that 
we have had thus far. It like the Editor of the  itizen said ‘Some people just hate Zuma.’ So 
I hope they will excuse us when we of the Ruling Party do what the ruling party should do 
govern to their best ability…] 
5.1.12. Analysis 12: Comments 
The descriptions in the above comments, as identified in this research, are: Sagaciousness, 
persuasion, patriotism, optimism and loyalty. 
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To some South African publics on Facebook, whether it is through Madonsela‟s report or the ad 
hoc committee‟s report, what matters is that there was corruption taking place and whoever is 
involved in the Nkandla corruption should be liable to pay back the money. While the ANC 
thinks that being the majority party in parliament is a way of convincing the South African 
publics that they are untouchable, some South African publics say that they won‟t be intimidated 
by numbers and refuse to be fooled by the ANC – they say that the opposition party did not 
pursue the matter in the report, as most of the ANC members of parliament were absent, having 
already decided everything at Luthuli House. Others are questioning the constitutional legitimacy 
in substituting the Public Protector‟s report with the Police Minister‟s report. In this they still 
refuse to be fooled by ANC majority status in parliament. To some South African publics, there 
will be no more voting for the ANC, as the party has become a disgrace under Zuma‟s leadership 
therefore do not deserve to be revote into power. Some of the ANC supporters are disappointed 
with their leaders who seem to defend corruption in the party. Some South Africans are very 
optimistic about the ANC winning the next elections, regardless of Zuma‟s involvement in 
Nkandlagate, because winning elections by the ANC has always been the case regardless of 
negative perceptions from people. This implies that it is just habitual for South African publics to 
complain and probably promise not to vote for ANC anymore, but in practice it does not happen. 
Some ANC supporters feel that the over-reliance on Madonsela‟s report, rather than the ad hoc 
report, indicates their hatred towards Zuma, and that the ANC should just do what the ruling 
party needs to do in governing to the best of their ability.  
The comments on the ANC post show two discursive genres: Adversary and pragmatism. 
Adversary discourse is that most South African publics have opposing views to the ANC post. 
They do not agree with whatever information ANC is relaying to them on Facebook. Pragmatism 
discourse is not to vote for the ANC in the next general election. Since the networked public 
sphere has created a space (Facebook) on which South African publics can hear a diversity of 
views from different politicians, including views from the opposition parties and with the 
interpretation of messages vested in their hands, they are able to filter the information they read 
by themselves and pick which makes more sense to them. This capability of Facebook is what 
makes it difficult for the ANC party to have its views on Nkandla taken seriously by the majority 
of South African publics with access to Facebook. To most South African publics, Zuma is a 
disgrace in the ANC. 
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5.2. CONCLUSION  
Although the digital divide is a major problem in South Africa, this research has shown that 
Facebook is proving to be a public network as per the theory of Benkler. The networked public 
sphere demonstrates in this research a shift from a traditional media public sphere controlled by a 
small number of commercial markets to a forum that is accessible to and generated by 
individuals, offering an increase in individuals‟ freedom to enjoy participating in the creation of 
information and knowledge. An objective forum, almost free from state control or any authority 
of rank and status – referred to by Habermas as the purpose of a public sphere – should be one 
regardless of status. Benkler‟s networked public sphere has enabled what Habermas refers to as 
inclusivity, whereby groups previously excluded from discussions and debates are now inclusive; 
therefore, most South African publics with access to Facebook, including opposition members, 
are able to participate in the Nkandlagate discussions. As per Benkler‟s argument through the 
networked public sphere of Facebook, many South African publics are able to communicate their 
observations and their viewpoints on Nkandla to many others in a way that cannot be controlled 
by the ANC. Facebook promotes freedom of speech of a politically critical nature, as seen in the 
Nkandlagate discussions. This indicates the power of networked public sphere as stipulated by 
Benkler, differentiating it from the past Habermas bourgeois public sphere.  
As shown in this research, most South African publics with access to Facebook are against 
Zuma‟s corruptive government associated with Nkandlagate and there is a public opinion that 
Zuma must pay back the money that was unjustifiably spent in the renovations of his Nkandla 
residence. Due to the direct democracy brought by the networked public sphere, South African 
publics appear to be free to express their views both on the EFF opposition Facebook page and 
the ruling ANC Facebook page; be it opposing or agreeing. This research has been an eye-opener 
in that, apart from Facebook being used by political parties for campaigning, Facebook could 
also be used by politicians to try to clean up the self-created mess made by the ANC over 
Nkandlagate. As indicated in this research, ANC government officials are trying their best to 
blackmail South African publics by using all sorts of lies in order to regain their dignity. 
However, according to most South African publics, they are using the wrong strategy. The best 
strategy that could help them achieve what they are looking for is the removal of Zuma from the 
ANC party. In this case, there are certain things that could not be achieved by the networked 
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public sphere alone; for example, in this case, the ANC trying to convince the South African 
publics using Facebook that Zuma and ANC are not in the wrong in as far as Nkandlagate is 
concerned.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Participatory democracy in action, freedom of expression in South Africa, the networked 
public sphere (but not the bourgeois public sphere), public opinion and watchdog? What is 
the reality?   
This chapter sums up all the arguments that the networked public sphere provides a distinguished 
set of potential benefits over traditional media, as it is harder for governments to control 
communications due to the highly distributed networked architecture of the Internet (Benkler, 
2006: 266). 
In trying to answer the research question how South African publics engaged in the social media 
platform, Facebook, over Nkandlagate in 2015 using critical discourse analysis guided by 
Benkler‟s networked public sphere, this research argues that discourse practices through which 
publics create texts and consume them are regarded as an important form of social practice 
which contributes to the constitution of the social world including social identities and social 
relations (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 61). It follows that how the South African publics engage 
in the Nkandla discussion through the research‟s descriptions, interpretation and explanation 
indicates their political social practices. The research discusses the five concepts mentioned 
above, through which the political social practices by the South African publics are expressed or 
indicated through their participation on the Nkandlagate discussions on Facebook.   
 
6.1. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN ACTION  
With Facebook, South African publics appear to exercise their democratic rights to enable them 
to participate in controversial political matters affecting their country. There is an indication that 
Facebook provides infrastructure for deliberation, which may eventually lead to real actions 
(Keane, 2000: 67). Most of the South African publics using Facebook may be wiser when they 
next vote – according to the information they have acquired about the Zuma‟s maladministration 
through the EFF on Facebook – and not vote for Zuma. However, participatory democracy, as 
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indicated by Bowman & Wills (2003), has brought about the challenge of ethical standards. The 
people who are information contributors might not be aware of journalistic values which are at 
least practised in other forms of media although not consistently; hence the use of indecent 
words. 
On the other hand, ruling political parties are also seen to further exercise their democracy by 
adapting to more individualised and direct forms of political participation (Inglehart, 1997; 
Norris, 2002; Bang, 2003; Bennett, 2008; Dalton), as is the case with the ANC in this research. 
As seen in the discussion, there is evidence of participatory democracy in this research. Everyone 
in South Africa with access to Facebook has an opportunity to contribute meaningfully 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004); from the ANC or EFF sides, and even neutrally. 
 
6.2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As seen from the posts, the EFF is free to exclusively express itself on how it feels about Zuma‟s 
government in relation to Nkandlagate, and every action taken by Zuma‟s administration to try 
and disassociate itself from Nkandlagate has been exposed by the EFF without any fear of the 
ANC, the ruling government. Likewise, South African publics are seen to speak freely whatever 
their views are, whether opposing or not, whether on the EFF Facebook page or the ANC page 
and in whatever manner they wish.  Mostly, it was seen on the ANC page how South Africa 
publics were freely critiquing President Zuma and his government officials on their corrupt ways 
of ruling South Africa, regarding Nkandla in particular. This tallies with Benkler‟s theories of the 
networked public in which everyone with Internet access has the freedom of expression on 
networked public spheres like Facebook. 
 
6.3. THE NETWORKD PUBLIC SPHERE, BUT NOT THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC 
SPHERE 
The EFF uses Facebook to disseminate information because Facebook offers a more public and 
democratic space that is easily accessible to South African publics. For some South African 
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citizens, Facebook has contributed to the lessening of the problem of having limited political 
knowledge, which has been hindering their capacity to get involved in the process of deliberation 
(Street, 2001: 217). This has been possible due to the South African government‟s incapability to 
control the flow information on Facebook (Benkler, 2006). 
For some ordinary members of the South African publics, Facebook has provided a social space 
where they are able to discuss, share and develop opinions on political issues (Benkler, 2006), as 
seen in the case of Nkandlagate. Hence, in this case, the Facebook networked public sphere is a 
contributor to a healthy public sphere. With Facebook, it is very difficult for the ANC as a ruling 
government to clarify its party and convince South Africans that they are not in the wrong, 
especially having the opposition party, the EFF, present as watchdogs disseminating information 
to justify how ANC is conducting itself as a ruling party. This is where democracy in the 
networked public sphere benefits citizens; information filtration is exclusively in their hands and 
they can use their subjective judgment to know who is speaking the truth and who is not and 
make informed decisions.  
As Benkler stated, the networked public sphere is hard to control or censor by powerful states, 
although not impossible. As seen in this research, the ANC is not controlling information flow 
against the party from the EFF, a characteristic that makes the networked public sphere a better 
alternative public sphere in a democratic world. Internet facilitates democratic discourse and 
civic culture to a wider range of citizens (Dahlgren, 2005) as there are many information sharing 
strategies. A diverse range of information providers is essential for a democratic society in order 
to enable viewers, readers and listeners to receive a broad spectrum of information from varying 
sources (Golding & Murdock, 2000). In this regard, most South African publics are able to give 
their views on Facebook and say how they feel about the ongoing Nkandla saga. Most of them 
are able to learn more from what others are saying on Facebook pertaining to Nkandlagate. In 
this regard, South Africa publics are aware of what is going on in their country. 
 
6.4. PUBLIC OPINION 
Facebook is helpful in the creation of knowledgeable South African publics, as seen with the 
Nkandla saga through public discussions, debates and sharing opinions on Nkandlagate. The 
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direct democracy enabled by the networked public sphere has benefitted South African publics 
by allowing them to freely create and consume information from many others, from both the 
ruling and the opposition parties' Facebook pages. This enabled them to gather enough 
information to help them formulate common views. There is a common public attitude or belief 
by those South African publics on Facebook about Zuma‟s maladministration of the South 
African government (Bianco & Canon, 2013). In this research, most of the South African publics 
with access to Facebook seem to be against Zuma‟s corrupt government and its involvement with 
Nkandlagate and there is a public opinion by most Facebook comments that Zuma must pay 
back the money that was unjustifiably spent in the renovations of his Nkandla residence.  
 
6.5. WATCHDOG 
Traditional media‟s ability to conduct investigative reporting and act as a public watchdog has 
been eroded by commercial adverts and government propaganda (Zhao, 1998). In most African 
countries, journalists have found it difficult to undertake evocative long form investigative 
reporting to expose the environmental, economic and societal effects brought about by these 
sectors (Rodrigues & Schiffin, 2015: 124). Facebook, being used by the South African publics in 
checking what the ANC are doing wrong, indicates some watchdog role being played.  It is only 
proper for the South African government, according to the South African publics on Facebook, 
to operate in accordance with the Constitution. There should be no corruption amongst 
government officials and the misused public funds must be paid back. The Public Protector‟s 
office should operate in the interests of the needs of the South African publics by exposing all 
the corruptions against the government. 
 
6.6. WHAT IS THE REALITY? 
This research has been an eye-opener in that, although many political parties have been able to 
achieve their political agenda using Facebook – namely, increasing their number of voters (as 
with Obama‟s 2008 election victory in the US, DA and EFF in South Africa) – there are certain 
political agendas that could not be achieved through the use of Facebook. According to this 
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research, ANC government officials appear to be blackmailing South African publics by using 
all sorts of lies to manipulate South African publics‟ views that the ANC and President Zuma are 
not in the wrong in the Nkandla saga, but rather some government officials and contractors of the 
Nkandla residence are guilty. However, this dissertation has shown that due to increasing 
participatory democracy in the public spheres, in which there is some diversity of information, 
the ANC is not completely successful with its agenda. 
In this scenario, this research could conclude that there are some political agendas that are not 
achievable through the networked public sphere.  According to most South African publics and 
social media posts in evidence, in order for the ANC party to regain its once lost dignity, Zuma 
must be removed from the party. 
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APPENDICES 
 ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS 
FIRST POST 
EFF STATEMENT ON CONTINUING PATHOLOGICAL LIES BY NATHI NHLEKO IN 
DEFENCE OF NKANDLA CORRUPTION (6 July 2015) 
The Economic Freedom Fighters notes desperate utterances by the Minister of Police, Nathi 
Nhleko, before the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF). Nhleko in defending 
multimillion Rand corruption in Nkandla claimed that a so-called “firepool” was also constructed 
at private residence of the former President Nelson Mandela in Qunu. The Mandela 
granddaughters have dismissed Nhleko‟s utterances as pure lies.  
The Minister has lied about cattle kraals and chicken runs being “security features”. He has lied 
about the total cost of security features in Nkandla being less than they actually are. He has lied 
about the Public Protector not finding that government built any houses for President Zuma and 
his family. He has lied about not knowing why and who approved the construction of the village 
consisting of 21 three-bedroomed houses at the Nkandla compound at an over-inflated cost of 
R6.5 million each. The Minister has committed his office and the police ministry to pathological 
lies and the defence of corruption instead of upholding the rule of law and ensuring that crooks 
like President Zuma are brought to book. 
The EFF further notes absurd utterances by Nhleko that his recent report and low-quality 
bioscope, where he exonerated President Zuma from any financial liability for non-security 
features in Nkandla, was not in compliance or intended to comply with the remedial action of the 
Public Protector. The Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, in her report “Secure in Comfort” 
requested the Minister of Police to ensure that no further security measures are installed in 
Nkandla. Nhleko has arrogantly reported that “more money” still needs to be spent in Nkandla 
on imaginary security features. The EFF condemns this brazen abuse of public funds for the 
indulgence of one man on whom we are already wasting spending obscene amount of money. 
The EFF further notes that resolution of the Alliance Summit where the ANC, Cosatu, the SACP 
and SANCO have resolved that Jacob Zuma will not pay back any money for upgrades he 
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unduly and unlawfully benefited from. The remarks by Gwede Mantashe that the Nkandla issue 
will disappear with the end of Zuma‟s term of office are delusional. 
The EFF wishes to reiterate that Zuma will PAY BACK THE MONEY! The EFF will not rest 
until every cent that Zuma has unduly and unlawfully benefited from is paid back. The EFF will 
not rest until Zuma is charged and prosecuted for unlawfully benefiting from upgrades at his 
Nkandla compound. 
Wherever Zuma appears in the presence of the EFF, be it in public places or in Parliament, he 
shall be asked to PAY BACK THE MONEY. This commitment to holding Zuma and his 
executive accountable is consistent with the EFF commitment to combating corruption. 
The Public Protector has requested National Treasury to assist President Zuma in determining a 
reasonable amount he must pay back. The EFF urges Minister Nhlanhla Nene to immediately 
comply with the remedial action of the Public Protector and assist Zuma in paying back the 
money including National Treasury in meeting its target of R1.1 trillion of revenue.  
COMMENTS 
1. He must PAY BACK THE MONEY! That has benefited unduly, South Africa is 
suffering from high rate of unemployment and is also suffering to pay for young people 
out there to enfeather their studies. but Zuma, Nhleko they should brought to book. and 
for that useless Gwede should be call to order. I hope we will come to an end with this, 
we can't allow Zuma to walk freely he MUST PAY BACK THE MONEY!!! Fighters 
2. So #DA invoicing was correct all along! #paybackthemoney 
3. Where ever we meet him we gonna shout pay back the money! On the street, shebeen, 
outside the country and even in the rallies of the ANC, wil shout pay back the money! 
4. Mina nje im confused. in terms of which Act, policy or regulation did Nhleko rely on. 
and seeing that the executive is now investigating themselves. we should rather close 
down the chapter 9 institutions because everytime they make findings the executive 
"reviews' them. so rather close them down. 
5. i just saw zuma's head entering te toilet door as i was peeing,,,,now i m waiting for him 
on his door, gues wt i m gona tel him! 
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6. I am shocked that EFF is not aware that Gwede requested ANC to pay the unduly 
benefits of Nkandla on behalf of Zuma, the point which wasn short down as "political 
risk" 
7. Has Nhleko not embarrassed himself enough in front of everybody with that award 
winning comedy of his? Now his shallow mind found it appropriate to drag Madiba(may 
his soul rest in peace) into his funny games. The buttocks defence force is running out of 
ammunition. The Nhleko movie must have been the last weapon in their arsenal. Now all 
they have is their bums. Its a checkmate. Paybackthemoney. 
8. he must pay back the back money 
9. he will not pay 
10. #pay_back_what_u_owe_us Rihana singing alng fighters 
 
SECOND POST 
EFF WELCOMES THE CONCOURT DECISION TO HAVE PUBLIC PROTECTOR JOIN 
THE PAY BACK THE MONEY CASE (6 October 2015) 
The EFF welcomes the Constitutional Court decision to have the Public Protector join in on the 
EFF case to have Zuma   PayBackTheMoney . This decision is significant because the powers of 
the Public Protector have been ridiculed and challenged by many in government, including by 
Zuma himself. The court is therefore affording the Public Protector not only an opportunity to 
clarify her powers in relation to the office of the president, but also to properly explain her 
remedial actions against Zuma.  
The EFF's prayer to the constitutional court is simple. The prayer is that Zuma must be ordered 
to #PayBackTheMoney improperly used in the upgrade of his home in Nkandla. This case will 
restore the dignity and respectability to the office of the Public Protector because many who steal 
and abuse state resources in government no longer hold the work of the Public Protector in high 
esteem because they think that they can get away with it like Zuma.  
Zuma has done everything in his power to avoid paying back the money. This includes using 
ministers like Nhleko to fabricate a path out of the responsibility to pay. He has also stood in 
parliament and lied, saying the money used in Nkandla was from a bank loan when it was not. 
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Zuma has lied about the Nkandla matter, ridiculed it and many who sought to raise it in 
parliament and allowed his ministers to also attack all who raise it, including the office of the 
Public Protector.  
It is no secret that parliament went to the extent of institutionalizing violence in the form of 
bouncers to protect Zuma from dealing with the question of #PayBackTheMoney. Fortunately, 
there are no bouncers, ministers, or preceding officers with their draconian speaker, to protect 
him from answering properly at the ConCourt. The judges ask direct question and seek direct 
answers; when they say when are you paying back the money, they do not expect you to say who 
must pay it. They say this because they would have already concluded that person they ask the 
question, must pay.  
The decision to allow the Public Protector to join makes this matter now officially of public 
interest as the Public Protector constitutionally represents all of the South African public 
regardless of their creed, party affiliation and class. The struggle against the abuse of state 
resources and corruption by politicians, their families and friends will indeed be advanced by a 
thousand steps. The EFF calls on all South Africans to also throw their support in this historic 
fight against a corrupt president who has no regard for public resources.  
COMMENTS 
1. I respect our judicial system,it was very clear to everyone that public protector's office 
was under attack because of the findings she and her office made against mr Zuma on the 
nkanda scandal,they tried all things under the sun to weaken that office,big up to the 
public protector and her team for not succumbing to the ANC and their tricks. 
2. We are the only party who speak the truth. Also we are government in waiting. Forward 
eff forward. 
3. #JZmustfall, he will be scared after today's case. 
4. The majority in parliament, point of orders, bouncers, presiding officers etc. cannot 
protect him this time....Lebelo leya fela, thotha e sale...  
5. After zuma pay the money he must explain why he fail to protect the public founds . 
#ZOMAmustFALL 
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6. I'm wondering what's ringing in the heads of all those puppets who screamed how zuma 
ddnt benefits unduly as per "P/P" findings,I'm wondering what's ringing in the head of 
thulas nxesi if he has one,I'm wondering what's happening to former minister of justice 
&COD,imagine the press conference where the findings of P/P led to these puppets 
suggestion laying criminal charges against her and her office...its a sad day south africa 
that all this is done by the very same ruling party who sings transparency...mxm!!!pay 
back the money"asijiki.... 
7. The SCA judgement today is the landmark judgement and also eye-opener to the 
constitutional democracy that this country is subscribed into and also to Jacob Zuma and 
his stooges who vehemently objected to the powers vested to PP by the constitution in 
terms of remedial actions.I wonder what Mathole,Doris Dlakude,Nkhensani Kubayi etc 
will say as the EFF has been exonerated by 5 judges in the SCA about the powers of the 
PP.Keep up the good work guys to hold executive to account.I smell victory in the 
forthcoming case of the pay back money as per PP report in Concourt in February next 
year.It will be a walkover. 
8. Fight against the EFF legal eagles at your own peril. We will expose you. 
9. Eish, I don't wish to be the number 1 right now....the only thing he should be thinking of 
is the admission of guilt(to pay back the money) and his fitness to hold the office being 
questioned. 
10. Mbuyiseni I must tell you straight that you guys are champions. You are doing more than 
excellent job. Big up to you guys 
 
THIRD POST 
EFF STATEMENT ON ACCUSATIONS THAT PUBLIC PROTECTOR IS PARTIAL IN 
JOINING PAY BACK THE MONEY CASE (13 October 2015) 
The EFF condemns the ANC's lazy logic that the Public Protector's decision to join the 
  PayBakcTheMoney case means that she is not impartial. This logic distorts the basic conception 
of our democracy and the place of the Public Protector in it. Above all institutions, the Public 
Protector is the first and most important defender of her office. When her office is under attack, 
she is expected to do everything in her power to protect it.  
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It is a matter of public record that the very ANC in parliament not only attacked and ridiculed the 
office of the Public Protector, they have also denied her the opportunity to represent her office in 
all ad-hoc committees that dealt with the Nkandla corruption. After closing all parliament doors, 
the ANC now wants to also block the Public Protector from entering the doors of our courts.  
The Public Protector has not joined the EFF, her office is not taking a membership of the EFF. 
The Public Protector is joining a court case, a legal matter that finds its genesis from her report, 
investigation and remedial action. The DA or any other political party, including the ANC, can 
also join and when they do so it does not make them members of the EFF.  
We call upon South Africans to also join in by supporting this case, because it is the case seeking 
to recover the money belonging to the people. The ANC is trying to deter our focus from the 
main question, a question they have collapsed through parliamentary rules in order to shut it 
down and bury it. This is the question of when is Zuma going to pay back the money.  
The ANC is speaking under suffocation because they can see the writing on the wall. There is no 
point of order, parliamentary ad hoc committee or bouncers who can stop Zuma from facing the 
truth that he must with speed, pay back the money that was unduly spent in his private home in 
Nkandla 
COMMENTS 
1. We need that money he must pay it back we knw that the ANC will defend him coz they 
knw if the president is going down they also going down coz the whole cabinet of the 
ANC is corrupt,now is the time asijiki EFF phambili maqabane 
2. Come 09 February ,Zuma will be appearing in the court of law over his scandal for the 
first time since he became the State President.This has been made possible by the EFF. 
3. He is going to pay there are no bouncers in court ethanda engathandi this problem is not 
for EFF they must stop thinking like animals this matter is for all south Africa. He also 
said he is going to fight corruption (NGC) he must lead by example 
4. ANC is afraid of the EFF in many fronts ... unfortunate utterances by ANC confirms their 
discomfort on the existence of EFF and uncompromising Integrity by PP ... ANC is afraid 
and shaking ..... 
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5. Diz sister s'dumo is confused hw can he blame the anc for labour brokers while he is 
serving under their executive he is dangerous nd playing double agenda 
6. Remind me again why i ever voted for the ANC. What is even more worrying is the 
silence of those still has little bit of integrity. Finger-pointing PP is just a desperate move 
which shows unconsciously incompetent this gang is. Forward Eff. 
7. When ANC was attempting to suffocate the PP on the Nkandla issue, why didn't ANC 
MP's( women) not use logic and provide PP platform to explain further her findings 
rather than demean& lambast her so unnecessarily ( so much of Liberation Movement) 
8. Phezu kwabo eff we will support you from kzn asijiki 
9. They got good spin doctors please my leaders becarefull, they'll want to drag & delay this 
case for as long as possible. They'll try to faulter you for one useless action, these are 
crooks & will use their gupta & their media(sabc, new age, citizien, bribed political 
analyists & ann7) platforms to redecule our course & to push their evil motion. My 
leaders be very cautious & remain solid as you are, I won't be surprised that the 1st day of 
the court won't even last 5min,we must come 100% prepared for those ligalised 
criminals. 
10. Worry not honourable Ndlozi, we are aware of their tricks and we are focused on the 
issue not the side issues which the Anc wish to achieve.......we are now familiar with their 
tactics and is no longer holding water any more. Zuma must pay back the money. 
 
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
FIRST POST 
FINALISATION AND ADOPTION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT (6 August 
2015) 
The parliamentary ad hoc committee set up to consider the Police Minister‟s report on the 
security upgrades at the President‟s private residence today finalised and adopted its report – 
which will be tabled for consideration by the National Assembly. The National Assembly 
directed the ad hoc committee to conclude and report on its work by 7 August 2015. 
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The committee expressed satisfaction that the reports of both the police minister and public 
works complied with the recommendations of the 2014 ad hoc committee. The police minister‟s 
report, in particular, gives a thorough and accurate picture of the state of affairs regarding the 
upgrades at Nkandla and was helpful during the course of the committee‟s in loco inspection. 
Contrary to the opposition political posturing, the report of the police minister was never 
intended as a replacement for any other investigative report on Nkandla, but was intended to 
provide a full account of the implementation of the recommendations of the previous ad hoc 
committee. 
The ad hoc committee found in its report that South Africans were misled about the so-called 
opulence at the private residence of the President and that there was a gross exaggeration of the 
scope, scale and cost of the project. Through the corrupt collusion of officials and private 
contractors, the prices were grossly inflated and the shoddy workmanship as well as poor quality 
facilities do not correlate with the amount of money paid. There is general consensus that those 
responsible for deviation from the PFMA should be held accountable and the money must be 
recovered from those found guilty of these transgressions. We are pleased that efforts are 
currently underway to ensure that all implicated in corrupt conduct are pursued legally and all 
the monies are recouped. 
The committee has recommended that the portfolio committees on public works, police and the 
standing committee on intelligence must ensure continuous monitoring of corrective actions to 
be taken by the relevant national departments. The committee also recommended that the 
relevant departments and law enforcement authorities ensure the expeditious conclusion of civil, 
criminal and disciplinary matters. 
It is unfortunate that the opposition sprung the so-called minority report, which is similar to the 
DA document it submitted to the committee when it started. Their claim that they participated in 
good faith therefore rings hallow, as their report is a proof that their minds were already made up 
even before the ad hoc committee could start with its business. 
The opposition has repeatedly claimed that the ad hoc process was illegal and unconstitutional. 
This is despite the establishment of the committee process itself being the consequence of the 
demand by the opposition to Parliament following the release of the police minister's report. 
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The minority report of the opposition does not only undermine the thorough work that the 
committee had undertaken, it also undermines the contribution they made during the process. 
The report, for instance, contradicts the frank contributions they made following the inspection 
visit at the private residence of the President. 
The EFF's decision to take the matter relating to the Nkandla security upgrades to the 
Constitutional Court is a right that any person or party enjoys under our constitution, and we are 
hopeful that it would bring to an end unnecessary disruptions and sloganeering in the National 
Assembly. We are hopeful that contesting the matter in Court would do them good, as Courts 
make judgment on the basis of facts, evidence and cogent legal arguments, not sloganeering, 
rowdiness and stunts which the EFF has become synonymous with. 
We reaffirm the legal and constitutional legitimacy of the ad hoc committee. It would have been 
a gross dereliction of constitutional duty if Parliament failed to initiate a process to formally 
consider the report of such national importance. 
 ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ANC CHIEF WHIP 
 
COMMENTS 
1. The next election am not gona vote for ANC am done with this shit party.... 
2. In the event that the ad Hoc committee sugests that President Zuma is supposed to pay 
back some of the money, we are prepared to pay R2,50 each bearing in mind that we are 
over a million and some unaudited supporters, we'll even have some leftover change to 
buy Thuli Madonsela wigs for the whole year. 
3. We might be poor but we are not stupid...... Stop insulting our intelligence. It is none of 
our business that the contractors have done a shoddy job. What matters is that Zuma 
orders that new police barracks be built outside his house and he took the existing ones as 
his property....... The swimming pool was no fire pool. Building a new kraal was not even 
in the security features........ Lastly why are not disputing the Public Protector's findings 
from the court since the judge is the only one entitled of disputing her findings? 
113 
 
4. Nelson Mandela at the launch of the office of the Public Protector in 1996 “Even the 
most benevolent of governments are made up of people with all the propensities for 
human failings. The rule of law as we understand it consists in the set of conventions and 
arrangements that ensure that it is not left to the whims of individual rulers to decide on 
what is good for the populace. The administrative conduct of government and authorities 
are subject to scrutiny of independent organs. This is an essential element of good 
governance that we have sought to have built into our new constitutional order.” 
5. Viva President Zuma viva,A demon was formed in a form of public protector to destroy 
our loved ANC and President, no weapon formed against ANC shall prosper 
6. President Must not pay! EFF must go to Hell! At court they will loose! They lack law 
knowledge , taking in to account the recent struck -off -the roll case! Where they 
interpreted as acquittal! They were exposed yesterday! 
7. Tambo, Mandela, Sisulu & Hani are turning in their graves.what a corrupt ANC.. Corrupt 
and selfish Crooks only!!!! 
8. Sasa Mosa Pakade Thuli Madonsela is an ANC loyal cadre 
9. COSATU and SACP should take this corruption and misuse of public resources to the 
high court.. Disgraceful.. Phansi corruption.. Phansi 
10. In your foolish statement, you are trying by all means not to mention the #PublicProtector 
Report. How was the general public misled and who misled it? On what basis are you 
nullifying the recommendations of the Public Protector? Surely, it cannot be on the basis 
of a 5-hour visit! A more than 2-year investigation report cannot be rejected on a 5-hour 
visit. Surely, you don't believe South Africans are that foolish and stupid, don't you? I 
don't think you guys understand what a Chapter 9 Institution is. 
 
SECOND POST 
ANC STATEMENT ON THE ADHOC COMMITTE ON NKANDLA REPORT (19 August 
2015). 
The African National Congress welcomes the conclusion of the work of the Adhoc Committee 
on Nkandla report which has diligently and thoroughly carried its task to conclusion. We also 
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welcome the findings and recommendations regarding the reckless and rampant corruption by 
government officials and contractors.  
It is our view that this matter must be given urgent attention to ensure that those responsible for 
this corruption should be held accountable for their wrong doing. We call law enforcement 
agencies and affected departments to act decisively.  
Measures must be taken by government to ensure that this does not repeat itself as it makes 
mockery of public prescripts when regulations are by-passed with almost impunity. We call on 
swift action to ensure full accountability by those implicated. 
242 Likes106 Comments37 Shares 
COMMENTS 
1. Why do we so much risk the ANC rich history with individuals? This can never be 
undone.......never. we have been subjected to humiliation from this person and we on the 
ground are suffering as we have to answer to this gemorse of Nkandla. Please comrades. 
...lets stop this and resort the ANC values that liberated this country. ANC 
LIVES.....VIVA....PHANTSI NGO HLOHLESAKHE PHANTSI 
2. They ANC says they support the report of police minister Nathi Nhleko and its 
recommendations,it also says swift actions must be taken against all those who are 
involved in the Nkandla saga.The same ANC rejects the Public Protectors report the 
report that is clear and its recommendations,and endoses the report of a Cabinet Minister 
undermining the report of a chapter 9 institution.The ANC contradicts itself in this 
matter.I think voter must be sobber in their mind when they are voting. 
3. We must protect our President against Draculars. 
4. Well done ANC, you have successfully destroyed the democracy of South Africa which 
was written in the blood of those who fought hard for many decades and died for it.... 
Well done!!! 
5. Only the morons welcome this stupid report, the people who truly love the ANC are 
deeply hurt by the damage done by Zuma's lapdogs who are hellbent on covering up his 
corrupt activities 
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6. LOL... The ANC is a joke. No intergrity whatsoever. Just dugging this great organization 
deeper and deeper into a hole. Losing more and more support. Why don't you just get rid 
of all the rotten apples and try and restore your credibilty with the people which you are 
ripping off. 
7. were the accused officials and contractors given the opportunity to explain their parts in 
this conspiracy? 
8. No vote for ANC frm me nxt year am tied of their issues. They must go to hell. 
9. So the last line reads "We call on swift action to ensure full accountability by those 
implicated." Why does this exclude Zuma who was implicated by Madonsela. Then again 
the Marikana report excluded Ramaphosa. 
10. u have to thank the DA coz without DA you wud have not know about the corruption 
took place  
@ your leadership home ANC. # I think DA is the best they are seriousely working like 
emoticon 
 
THIRD POST 
DA‟S DECISION TO APPROACH THE COURT ON NKANDLA MATTER (August 19, 
2015) 
The Office of the ANC Chief Whip notes the decision by the DA to approach the Western Cape 
High Court regarding Parliament‟s adoption of the report of the ad hoc committee that processed 
the police minister‟s report. The right to approach the courts to adjudicate on matters, including 
the DA‟s failure to substantively persuade parliament on the correctness of its arguments, is a 
right enshrined in our democratic constitution. 
 We know too well that Courts and police stations have now become fashionable places for 
media theatrics, where opposition parties attract a certain degree of media attention on the door 
steps of the Courts and police stations than they would in their offices. 
 Far from being concerned with media stunts of the opposition, our focus as the Majority Party in 
this institution is now on ensuring that important recommendations passed by Parliament 
yesterday are implemented by the executive. 
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 ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ANC CHIEF WHIP 
COMMENTS 
1. The problem with the opposition parties in Parliament is that they have taken the public 
prosecution persued by media institutions and imperialists on Jacob Zuma and paraded it 
to our Society as a legitimate prosecution. When it is tested by the rule of law and it 
doesn't go their way, they cry foul and then discredit whatever is not in their Favour. The 
public Protector's office should be an independent unbias and non-political favouring 
office. So many of the South Africans (including myself) believed in that office's 
Nkandla report up untill the minister's report and the ad hoc Committee's visit to 
Nkandla. It would really be naive and stupid of any1 not to see that contradictions of 
reality SEEN by the ad hoc committee and The Public protector's report are there! It is 
not a matter of who's more trustworthy than the other but of facts. Money was misused, 
corruption occured and possibly money laundering too. This publicity stunt of being 
shamely obsessed With President Zuma is utterly rubbish. Infact, alot of Tax payers 
money is also used extensively by the DA using our justice system to further ridicule the 
ANC at all costs for political and publicity points. Now that we all know and AGREE 
that money was misused and Inflated in the Security upgrades in Nkandla, shouldn't we 
be focusing on finding those who committed this crime using President Zuma's private 
residence to enrich themselves and subject them to the rule of law. The DA and EFF's 
obsession is nothing but publicity stunt. One day,they agree with the ad hoc committee, 
the next day, they are against it. They can't have it both ways. Its a game of obsession vs 
reality and i choose to believe reality. Good work by the ad hoc committee, now bring 
criminal charges to the wrong doers and lay this thing to rest. Let DA and EFF keep 
shouting while you continue work and representing South Africans. 
#as_i_wait4_the_insults 
2. Since when the minister of police is responsible for investigating public officials?Is the 
substitution of the report of the public protector legitimate and constitutional? We won't 
be fooled by ANC majority in parliament. The adoption of Nathi's report is the decision 
of Luthuli House in the National Assembly. 
117 
 
3. I am dissapointed by ANC on the Nkandla issue, we love our movement but how leaders 
protect corruption hurt us. 
4. The DA is doing what i the ANC voter would love to see happening, i didn't vote for 
corruption to be swept under the capert 
5. Every year ppl threatning the ANC that they will not vote for ANC but the ANC win & 
next comming elections the ANC is going to win again.If don't like the ANC then keep 
your vote & save comment.We will vote the ANC.#Siyaqhuba 
6. Those that feed on crumbs of corruption will forever be saying Viva and long live ANC 
even when it is doing wrong cause their agenda in politics of the stomachs has rendered 
them useless in the Arena of independed thinkers. 
7. I am yet to be convinced by one argument to the contrary of the findings of the Ad Hoc 
Committee. All I have seen is the over reliance to Thuli Madonsela's report to the three 
reports that we have had thus far. It like the Editor of the Citizen said "Some people just 
hate Zuma." So I hope they will excuse us when we of the Ruling Party do what the 
ruling party should do govern to their best ability. And anyone who considers it 
insufficient, I hope they are as kind to the alternatives in retrospect to their governance in 
areas they currently govern. For us and for now, A luta continua and for those who fail to 
win arguments in Parliament and decide to spend money in courts, we shall see you there. 
#Siyaqhuba 
8. ANC has became a disgrace under Zuma's leadership, I will never vote for this party 
again. 
9. Have ya noticed in Parliament yesterday after the report was adopted that all the majority 
party's benches were empty, they were there to endorse the report, using their majority, 
how then do we begin to convince Parliament about the position of opposition when the 
ANC doesn't want to be persuaded because the same ANC does not partake in 
discussions in Parliament, they only go there to vote and then ya write this article telling 
us that the opposition failed to persuade Parliament, are ya in ya right mind? Because the 
whole process was done and concluded in Luthuli House others are straying along the 
games played by ANC, the formation of those committees, decisions, adoption and 
voting for those reports were designed by Luthuli House, so WHO ARE YOU FOOLING 
ANC???!!!! 
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10. Nkandla nkandla always we are tired now about this nonsense zuma will be out in the 
office while the opposite are busy about nkandla what else ? WHERE POLICE ARE 
BRUTALY KILLED / SENZO MEYIWA KILLERS / KILLING OF THE PEOPLE / 
MARIKANA MASARCA / ANCIEDENTS IN OUR ROADS / NESFAS 
CORRUPTION /LOW SHADDING / NPA CNATIONAL PROSECUTION 
ATHOURITY STABILLASATION/ GUNS IN WRONG HANDS/ TEACHERS 
RETIREMENT BEFORE TIME/ THE SAFFETY OF CHILDREN AN TEACHERS IN 
SCHOOL/ JUST A FEW AGENDA AND STOP THIS NKANDLA 
 
 
 
 
 
